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Abstract
The Australian Aboriginal language Ungarinyin (Worrorran) has one single complex-clause construction for
expressing reported speech (‘say’), that can also signal reported thought (‘think’) and attribute intentions
(‘want’). By demonstrating which formal and functional distinctions are essential to the interpretation of
this Ungarinyin construction, the present paper aims to contribute to understanding the exact nature of
the syntactic relation involved in reported speech constructions. Following the account of McGregor (1994;
1997; 2008), I analyse the clausal syntax of reported speech constructions as a dedicated syntactic relation,
separate from more familiar clausal relations such as coordination and subordination. I call this relation the
‘frame-in’ construction.
Subsequently, I compare the conventionalised reported speech construction in Ungarinyin to a variety of
more loosely integrated non-conventionalised or semi-conventionalised strategies for expressing speech and
thought attribution in the language. Collectively I refer to these strategies as examples of ‘defenestration’,
constructions without the typical marking of the syntactic frame-in relation, while expressing the meaning
associated with a regular frame-in construction. Instances of defenestration differ from syntactic frame-in
in that they express the meaning of a frame-in construction through transparent compositional means.
I argue that types of defenestration show remarkable regularities in Ungarinyin, and, tentatively, cross-
linguistically, which has consequences for the analysis of indexicality and iconicity in syntax and presents a
new context for analysing the syntax of reported speech constructions in relation to multimodal features,
particulary for the category of free (in)direct speech and ‘zero quotatives’.
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1. Introduction1
The syntax of reported speech is profoundly strange (McGregor, 1994; De Roeck, 1994; Vandelanotte,2
2008; Vandelanotte and Davidse, 2009; Buchstaller, 2014; D’Arcy, 2015). The English direct speech con-3
struction, as in (1a), shares features with asyndetic conjunction as in (2a), and indirect speech in (1b) has4
formal correspondences to complement constructions, as in (2b). But the structures in (1) and (2) also differ5
from each other remarkably with respect to their pragmatic, semantic and syntactic properties.6
(1) a. Mary said: “John has fed the dog”7
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b. Mary said (that) John fed the dog8
(2) a. The door opened. Mary entered9
b. Mary made sure (that) John fed the dog10
If we acknowledge that reported speech constructions do not correspond to any other common syntactic11
relation (as I argue in section 2), there are two obvious conclusions: (1) reported speech involves a syntactic12
relation that is different from any other syntactic relation, it constitutes a syntactic class in its own right;13
or (2) reported speech cannot be defined in syntactic terms, it does not involve a single syntactic relation.14
The second position is taken by D’Arcy (2015), who concludes, citing Buchstaller’s (2014) observation15
that “ ‘quotation’ as a whole is not easily captured via general syntactic parameters” (Buchstaller, 2014:16
42):17
‘That this view resonates across the field of quotative scholarship is conveyed by the fact that18
researchers are increasingly turning to alternative analyses to account for the structure, meaning,19
and interpretation of quotation, particularly when considered through a cross-linguistic lens.20
[...] [T]he primary view is no longer one that privileges syntax as the sole structure-building21
component of the grammar and that restricts the semantic one to an independent interpretive22
role. Rather, syntactic structure and semantic interpretations are increasingly seen as derivative23
of, and determined by, context. In this approach, discourse function, semantics, and pragmatics24
come to the fore’ (D’Arcy, 2015: 46).25
Although I agree with D’Arcy’s (2015), presumably uncontroversial, remark that syntax is not the26
‘sole structure-building component of the grammar’ I would strongly object to the conclusion that the27
phenomenon of reported speech is therefore determined by context.1 Instead, I would like to defend the28
position, first explicitly formulated in McGregor (1994), that the syntactic properties of reported speech29
build a specific syntactic relation in their own right, that can stand alongside more traditional syntactic30
relations such as complementation, coordination etc.31
This proposal is immediately confronted with two problems: First, as Buchstaller (2014) remarks, there is32
is a great variety of structures in the languages of the world that can express the proposed syntactic relation33
and these, at least partially, correspond to syntactic structures associated with other syntactic relations. I34
believe this situation is actually not much different from that of many other types of syntactic categories,35
but the attested function-form diversity does pose specific requirements on our theory of syntax. I propose36
that the constructionist (Goldberg, 1995; 2006; Croft, 2001) approach explored in section 4 meets these37
requirements and can account for the observed phenomena. Second, as D’Arcy (2015) indicates, in many38
languages, matrix clauses apparently marking reported speech, are often left out, as in (3).39
(3) John entered the room. “Has this dog been fed already?” No answer.40
Even though no clausal element in (3) indicates that John asks the question whether the dog has been41
fed, this clearly is the interpretation of the second clause above: the clause represented between quotation42
marks in (3) carries a function that is similar to the element between quotation marks in (1a) and that, e.g.,43
the second clause in (2a) has not.2 This phenomenon has received wide attention under the label of ‘free44
(in)direct speech’ (Bally, 1912; Lips, 1926; Volosˇinov, 1973; Eckhardt, 2012; Maier, 2015; Gallai, 2016), and45
in interactional linguistics under the label of ‘zero quotatives’ (Mathis and Yule, 1994).46
In order to explain the presence versus absence of matrix clauses in the expression of the proposed47
syntactic relations involved in reported speech, we need a principled view of structural optionality in syntax.48
I suggest that this can be gained if we build on existing analyses of insubordination and extra-sentential49
1D’Arcy (2015) appears to ascribe the above view to Buchstaller (2014), which, in my interpretation, misrepresents the
position cited. Buchstaller (2014) follows the above statement by introducing semantically based constructionist definitions of
reported speech, thereby proposing a syntactic analysis.
2Assuming that written language is always secondary to spoken language this similarity in meaning cannot be attributed
to the quotation marks (for further arguments defending this position, see Saka, 2006).
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dependency (Evans, 2007; 2009; Mithun, 2008; Verstraete et al., 2012; D’Hertefelt and Verstraete, 2014) and50
optionality in grammar (McGregor, 2013).51
The article is organised as follows: in section 2 I first list some of the properties that set apart the meaning52
and structure of reported speech (section 2.1), and in section 2.2 I introduce the proposal by Rumsey (1982)53
and McGregor (1994) to describe the syntax of reported speech as a syntactic relation in its own right. Section54
3 presents the main case study dealt with in this article, reported speech constructions in the Australian55
Aboriginal language Ungarinyin (Worrorran). The language is particularly relevant for our purposes, since56
it contains only a single (but multi-functional) reported speech construction, resulting in minimal variation57
in the expression of the syntactic relation involved in reported speech. Section 3.1 provides some typological58
background on the language and section 3.2 introduces the form and interpretations of the construction.59
Section 3.3 suggests why Ungarinyin presents a useful case study for examining the structural expression of60
the frame-in relation. After considering these theoretical and empirical observations, section 4 provides a61
comprehensive definition of the syntactic relation involved in reported speech constructions, a relation I call62
frame-in. Section 5 discusses how this definition can account for the idiosyncracies observed in reported63
speech. Having defined the frame-in relation within a constructionist approach it becomes possible to ask the64
question of how to treat the meaning of a frame-in construction when elements of its semantic representation65
are not expressed by clausal constructions. I refer to this phenomenon as defenestration and illustrate66
it on the basis of Ungarinyin in section 6. Section 6.1 describes the conditions under which defenestration67
occurs in Ungarinyin and section 6.2 distinguishes two types of defenestration, internal and external.68
The phenomenon of defenestration is related back to the discussion about multimodality and grammar in69
the concluding section 7, which discusses some implications of defenestration for the conceptualisation of70
grammar more generally.71
2. The syntactic exceptionality of reported speech72
2.1. Introduction73
Reported speech constructions display a range of idiosyncratic properties, cf. the list of features in (4).74
The properties (4a-4h) are based on McGregor (1994: 66–68), who uses these to demonstrate that reported75
speech constructions do not involve a regular type of coordination/parataxis or subordination/hypotaxis.76
Properties (4i-4n) have been added based on additional sources, and the labels in (4) are mine.77
(4) a. dependence indeterminacy: ‘It is not clear that the say clause in indirect speech is the main78
clause, the other dependent on it’ (McGregor, 1994: 66, also cf. De Roeck, 1994; Vandelanotte,79
2008);80
b. prominent subordination: Indirect speech does not generally show signs of reduced discourse81
status (encoding backgrounded, given, presupposed information), which makes it unlikely that82
they should be analysed as dependent clauses (which commonly do have a lower discourse status)83
(McGregor, 1994: 67, also cf. Verstraete, 2011);84
c. stable semantic relations: Changing the order of the clauses in (English) direct speech85
(as in ‘direct quote preposing’ Hooper and Thompson, 1973: 467) does not affect the semantic86
relations between them, which is atypical for parataxis and the order of the clauses in indirect87
speech is mostly rigid, which is atypical for hypotaxis (McGregor, 1994: 67-68);88
d. interpolation: ‘In (English) direct speech, the clause of speech may be interpolated within89
the reported clause. [...] Such interpolations are not permitted in paratactic combinations of90
clauses’ (McGregor, 1994: 68);91
e. deictic shift: ‘The fact that the deictic centre of a direct quote remains that of the reported92
utterance, but shifts to that of the present speech situation in indirect quotation goes unexplained93
[under traditional accounts of reported speech]’ (McGregor, 1994: 68, also cf. Vandelanotte,94
2004a; Vandelanotte and Davidse, 2009; Nikitina, 2012; Evans, 2013);95
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f. non-clausal signalling: ‘[C]lauses of speech may be omitted without affecting the character96
of the quote as a quote [...]. The reported piece is often uttered with a special voice quality. This97
phenomenon cannot happen elsewhere in parataxis’ (McGregor, 1994: 68, also cf. Blythe, 2009);98
g. multiple clause relationality: ‘A clause of speech may frame another clause, or a syntagm99
of clauses, i.e. a complex sentence. It may also frame a set of complex sentences corresponding100
to a paragraph’ (McGregor, 1994: 68);101
h. island constraint violations: As the sentence ‘Who did you say would come?’ shows, a wh-102
argument from the message clause may occur in the say-clause, which is atypical for hypotactic103
constructions (McGregor, 1994: 68, also cf. Dor, 2005, and example (32));104
i. sub-clausal quotes: The quoted element can be smaller than a clause (i.e. the reverse of the105
property of multiple clause relationality in 4g);3106
j. atypical transitivity patterns: There is great language-internal and cross-linguistic vari-107
ation in the extent to which markers of transitivity, such as ergative case and object-markers108
are found with in reported speech constructions (Munro, 1982; Rumsey, 1994; 2010; Buchstaller,109
2014);110
k. recurrent modal effects: Across languages it has been found that highlighting a matrix111
clause in a reported speech construction (i.e. the first clauses in 1) can either imply that the112
speaker does not take responsibility for the meaning expressed in the reported message clause113
(i.e. the second clauses in 1), or strengthen commitment, depending on the tense and person114
properties involved (Vandelanotte, 2004b; Cornillie, 2009; Spronck, 2015c);115
l. recurrent evidential effects: As Haßler (2002; 2010) points out, expressing conflicting116
attitudinal evaluations in a declarative construction can prompt the interpretation that the117
content describes a reported message. For example, the combination of ‘surprisingly’ and ‘of118
course’ in ‘Surprisingly, he is, of course, “delighted to meet us” ’ signals ‘He said that he was119
delighted to meet us’ (these examples were initially constructed in French, also cf. Banfield, 1982:120
215);121
m. polyfunctionality: Cross-linguistically, reported speech constructions tend to develop a re-122
markable range of functions, ranging from complex clauses expressing ‘thinking’, ‘wanting’, ‘caus-123
ing’, ‘beginning’ etc., to more grammatical markers, such as complementisers (Rumsey, 1990;124
Reesink, 1993; van der Voort, 2002; Gu¨ldemann, 2008; Chappel, 2012; Matic´ and Pakendorf,125
2013, Pascual, 2014: ch. 4, Spronck, 2016);126
n. ‘semi-conventional’ multimodality: Alongside exceptional prosodic and other acoustic fea-127
tures (4f), reported speech is often accompanied by recurrent multimodal signals, such as iconic128
gesturing and eye-gaze (Blackwell et al., 2015; Stec et al., 2015).129
Despite all these exceptional properties, no languages have been found that do not show some dedicated130
strategy for expressing reported speech, or that cannot signal the meaning associated with a reported speech131
construction as in (1) (see Cristofaro, 2013).132
2.2. Rumsey’s and McGregor’s notion of syntactic framing133
The properties in (4) are highly diverse. Most relate to syntactic features (4a, 4c, 4d, 4g, 4h, 4i), some134
are more traditionally pragmatic (4b, 4e, 4k, 4l), or lexico-semantic (4j, 4m), or concern general structural135
features of reported speech (4f, 4n). The high number of formal features makes it unlikely that any one136
pragmatic or lexico-semantic analysis can explain all of the properties in (4), but approaching reported137
speech as simply a formally idiosyncratic phenomenon is equally insufficient, if its exceptional pragmatics138
and semantics are not accounted for.139
Observations such as those in (4) lead McGregor (1994; 1997; 2008) to conclude that the relation between140
the (clausal) elements involved in reported speech constructions should be recognised as a syntactic class in141
3I thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this additional property.
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its own right, with a specific set of associated semantic and pragmatic functions. Following Rumsey (1982;142
1990), McGregor (1994) labels this syntactic relation ‘framing’.4 Without intending to contest any aspect143
of the analysis put forward by McGregor (1994ff.), I will refer to the syntactic relation involved in reported144
speech constructions with the minimally different term frame-in relation, in order to avoid confusion145
with more familiar, non-syntactic interpretations of ‘framing’.5 Discussing examples from the Australian146
Aboriginal language Gooniyandi (Bunaban), McGregor (1997) describes the frame-in relation as follows:147
‘the interclausal relationship involved in reported speech constructions can be modeled as per148
the relationship between a picture and its frame. [...] [The framing clause] delineates the clause149
from the surrounding clauses, and indicates that it is to be viewed and evaluated [...] as a150
demonstration, rather than a description. [...] Viewing a clause as a demonstration represents a151
type of modification that clause expresses. [...] [This type of modification] belongs in the same152
category as other propositional modifiers such as tharri ‘mistakenly believe’, yiganyi ‘uncertain,153
possibly’, marlami ‘no’, mangarri ‘no, not’, minyjirra ‘true’, etc. The difference is that whereas154
these particles modify the proposition by indicating the speaker’s evaluation of its truth or falsity,155
reporting modifies the proposition by indicating its evidential status’ (McGregor, 1994: 77-78).156
Based on this description, the frame-in relation is characterised by five features:157
(5) a. frame-in involves a delineating element and a delineated element;158
b. the delineated element under frame-in stands out from the surrounding discourse;159
c. frame-in indicates that the delimited clause is not descriptive, but to be interpreted as a ‘demon-160
stration’ (in the sense of Clark and Gerrig, 1990);161
d. frame-in involves a sentential modification relation between the delimiting and the delimited162
element;163
e. this modification relation has an evidential meaning.164
As I aim to demonstrate in section 5.2, this definition of frame-in indeed does allow us to explain the165
properties of reported speech in (4), but in order to apply the notion of frame-in consistently, each of the166
features in (5) requires additional motivation and specification. Before turning to this task in section 4,167
however, I would like to provide a detailed case study of the minimum of empirical facts a frame-in relation168
has to account for in section 3.169
3. Frame-in in a language without a direct-indirect speech opposition170
In this section I will introduce a particularly transparent type of reported speech construction in the171
Australian Aboriginal language Ungarinyin (Worrorran, McGregor and Rumsey, 2009). Section 3.1 sketches172
the broad typological profile of the language and section 3.2 outlines the form and functions of Ungarinyin173
reported speech. Apart from examples cited from published sources, the data in these sections are based174
on original field recordings by the author, consisting of spontaneous narrative discourse and dialogues. In175
order to homogenise the spelling throughout, all examples have been transliterated to the orthography used176
in Spronck (2015b).177
4Silverstein (1976) also uses the term ‘framing’ in referring to the matrix clause of reported speech, but provides insufficient
illustration to determine if the notion is to be interpreted in the grammatical sense of the later authors.
5Note that ‘framing’ in the syntactic sense of McGregor (1994ff.) is not related to the interpretation of ‘frame’ in the sense
of Goffman (1974). A Goffmanian concept that more accurately approaches the meaning of ‘framing’ as used here, is that of
‘keying’ (Goffman, 1974: 48ff; also cf. Besnier, 1993), but I will not directly draw on this literature in this article.
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3.1. Ungarinyin178
Ungarinyin is a non-configurational and head-marking language, traditionally spoken in the central179
western Kimberley region of North Western Australia (Rumsey, 1982; Spronck, 2015b: ch. 2). In accordance180
with this typological profile the language has limited case morphology (even though it can optionally express181
genitive, dative, instrumental, commitative and locative case) and an extensive verbal inflectional template182
(Nichols, 1986), as illustrated in (6).6183
(6)
fut/– –prs/pst/ –du/
imp– o– s– irr– defs– –root– –refl –opt –pauc –cont –Dir –io
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6
184
As shown above, subject and object arguments are obligatorily marked as prefixes, whereas indirect185
objects are cross-referenced as suffixes.7 Verbal constructions in Ungarinyin often combine an inflecting186
verb as in (6) with a verbal particle (a ‘coverb’). These mostly contribute grammatical (inflecting verb) and187
lexical meaning (coverb) to the complex verb construction. Ungarinyin has noun classes, which are marked188
through agreement patterns and on demonstratives and, like in other Australian languages, word order is189
often variable. Subordinate clauses have a relatively wide range of functions and few formal distinctions (cf.190
Hale, 1976; Nordlinger, 2006).8191
Ungarinyin is highly endangered, and currently remains to be spoken by an estimated two dozen speakers,192
but several highly motivated individuals in the Ngarinyin community are pushing for revitalisation of the193
language.194
3.2. The Ungarinyin frame-in construction195
While Ungarinyin discourse mostly consists of simple clauses or subordinate clauses with a general subor-196
dinating suffix -ngarri, the language has one frequent complex clause construction. This is the construction197
used to express reported speech, as illustrated in (7).198
(7) [[
[[
[[
mindi-mindi
mindi-mindi
nm.anaph-redup
mangkay
mangkay
remain
ngima
nga1-y2i-ma
1sg-fut-do
]
]
]
amara
a1-ma-ra
3msg-do-pst
]
]
]
199
‘ “I will stay here”, he said’ or: ‘He said (that) he would stay there’200
‘ “I want to stay here”, he thought’ or: ‘He thought (that) he would stay there’201
‘He wanted to stay here’ or: ‘ “I want to stay here”, he said’ or: ‘He said (that) he wanted to stay202
there’9203
In (7), the reported clause is indicated by the inner square brackets, the matrix clause appears to the204
right of the reported clause and the frame-in relation is symbolised by the outer square brackets.10 This can205
be schematically represented as in (8).206
6For a fuller discussion of this template and the categories in (6) not further mentioned here, see Spronck (2015b: 43ff).
7For this reason verbal constructions are clearly marked for transitivity. In exceptional cases, an intransitive verb can be
transitivised by a person suffix in position +6, which can then refer to a direct object (Spronck, 2015b: 48).
8For further details about Ungarinyin grammar, see Rumsey (1982), Coate and Oates (1970) and Spronck (2015b: ch. 2).
9All glosses in this article follow the Leipzig glossing rules standard, except the following: AMBIPHoric pronoun; ANAPHoric
pronoun; AV, actor voice (Saaroa); CONTinuative aspect; CORE, core case (Saaroa); COS, change of state (Saaroa); DEClar-
ative mood (Kwaza); DEFS, definite subject; DUal number; EVIDential (Saaroa); IO, indirect object; ITRV, iterative aspect;
LOCation (Saaroa); nm, neuter gender m; nw, neuter gender w; Object; PAUCal; PROXimal; REDUPlication; Singular
(Kwaza); Subject; SUBordinate; TEMPoral (Saaroa). The subscript numbers in morphemic glosses of Ungarinyin examples
signal morphophonemic alternations, described by Rumsey (1982: 17–30).
10Note that in order to increase readability, the bracket notation used in (7) and all the example sentences below is not
exhaustive in that the matrix clause is not individually indicated, i.e. in (7) a second set of inner brackets could be added as
follows: [[ mindi-mindi mangkay ngima ] [ amara ]]. Since in all the examples used here, any element within the frame-in
relation that is not a reported clause belongs to the matrix clause, this means that the matrix clause is formed by all words
within the outer brackets and outside the inner brackets in the example sentences. In the schematic representations in (8), (12)
and (14) the matrix clause is explicitly marked by inner brackets with subscript labels.
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(8) [ [ ... ]reported clause [ -ma- ]matrix clause ]frame−in construction207
As the translations in (7) suggest, the Ungarinyin frame-in construction can receive multiple interpre-208
tations. In addition to regular reported speech, the construction may also express reported thought, and209
the lexical meaning of ‘to want’ in matrix position, which I label ‘reported intentionality’. However, within210
the skeleton construction represented in (8), several semantic or structural elements may be specified that211
prompt an interpretation of the construction as either reported speech, reported thought or reported in-212
tentionality. The reported speech meaning in (9a–9b) is brought out by the overt reference to a reported213
addressee (9a), an introductory phrase specifying that the following clause involves a speech event, or a214
sound symbolic reported ‘message’, indicating that the reported clause reflects an utterance, vocalisation or215
call (9b).216
(9) a. [[
[[
[[
koj
koj
drink
ba
ba2-a
IMP-go
]
]
]
budmanangka
burr-ma-nangka
3pl.S-do-3sg.IO
]
]
]
217
‘ “Come drink,” they say to him’ (090812JENGPDi, 1:10-1:12)218
b. wurla
wurla
talk
wurla
wurla
talk
nyengarri
nya2-y2i-ø-ngarri
3fsg-be-PRS-SUB
[[
[[
[[
wak
wak
caw
wak
wak
caw
]
]
]
nyuma
nya2-ma-ø
3fsg-do-PRS
]
]
]
219
‘She says: “Wak, wak!” ’ (100722-02NGUS, 2:30-2:32)220
A reported thought interpretation, as in (10), is predominantly suggested by the absence of a reported ad-221
dressee in the matrix clause, or, as in this instance, a preceding clause introducing the frame-in construction222
as describing a reported thought event.223
(10) nini
ni-ni
think-REDUP
e
a1-y2i-ø
3msg-be-PRS
[[
[[
[[
kunya
kunya
what
nguma
nga1-iy-ma
1sg-FUT-do
kanda
kanda
nw.PROX
]
]
]
ama
a1-ma-ø
3msg-do-PRS
]
]
]
224
‘He is thinking. “What can I do here?” he thinks’ (090813AJMJSMPDm, 2:01-2:02)225
Interpretations of reported intentionality as in (11) impose the most restrictions on the Ungarinyin226
frame-in construction: for a ‘want’ interpretation as in (11a), the subject of the embedded clause has to227
have a first person singular value, whether the subject of the matrix clause is singular or plural and the228
embedded main verb requires future tense marking. A special instance of reported intentionality is formed229
by examples as in (11b), in which the embedded subject is not a first person singular form, and the matrix230
verb has an oblique suffix that is coreferential with the subject of the embedded clause. This interpretation231
is more accurately described as ‘indirect causation’.232
(11) a. [[
[[
[[
ngurr
ngurr
hit
ngimanangka
nga1-iy-ma-nangka
1sg.S-FUT-do-3sg.O
]
]
]
budmara
burr-ma-ra
3pl-do-PST
]
]
]
233
‘They wanted to hit it’ (100903-24NGUN, 8:56-8:58)234
b. [[
[[
[[
yinda
yinda
spear
wandij
wandij
make
irrora
irr-w1u-ra
3pl.O:3msg.S.FUT-act.on-1sg.IO
]
]
]
amarerndu
a1-ma-ra-rndu
3msg.S-do-PST-3pl.IO
]
]
]
235
‘He wanted them to make him a spear’, or: ‘He forced them to make him a spear’ [lit.: ‘ “They236
will make a spear for me”, he did with respect to them’] (Rumsey, 1982: 162)237
The schematic representations in (12) summarise the cues for each of the interpretations illustrated above238
(in addition to the regular grammatical glosses, ‘RepAddr’ stands for ‘reported addressee’ and for reasons of239
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space, the subscripts ‘reported clause’ and ‘matrix clause’ have been abbreviated to ‘reported’ and ‘matrix’).240
Note that none of the features in (12) conclusively mark the construction for the respective interpretation:241
in all instances a reported speech or thought interpretation remains possible.242
(12) a. [ [ ... ]reported [ -ma- + IORepAddr ]matrix ]frame−in → speech243
b. [ [ ... ]reported [ -ma- ]matrix ]frame−in → thought244
c. [ [ ... Si + FUT ]reported [ Si -ma- ]matrix ]frame−in → intention245
d. [ [ ... Sj + FUT ]reported [ Si -ma- + IOj ]matrix ]frame−in → causation246
For completeness, (13) shows two further instances of Ungarinyin reported speech constructions. The247
naming interpretation in (13a) has a reported ‘clause’ that is entirely formed by a name, but otherwise248
differs little from regular reported speech. The construction in (13b) is quite distinctive, as it shows the249
matrix clause interjecting the reported clause, which is otherwise unattested. It necessarily also includes the250
epistemic modal clitic -karra ‘maybe’, in which case it reports an utterance, thought or belief on behalf of251
a reported speaker/cognisant that the speaker in the current speech moment holds untrue.252
(13) a. [
[
[
malyannga
malyan-nga
for.nothing-only
[
[
[
junba
junba
dance
jandu
jandu
designer
jirri
jirri
m.ANAPH
]
]
]
ngarrkumanangka
ngarr-w2a2-ma-ø-nangka
1pl.INCL.S-IRR-do-PRS-3sg.IO
]
]
]
253
‘We don’t just call him ‘corroboree designer’ for nothing’ (Coate, 1966: 106, lines 39-40)254
b. [[
[[
[[
goannakarra
goannakarra
goanna-maybe
]
]
]
ngamara
nga1-ma-ra
1sg-do-PST
[
[
[
nyalangkun
nya1-langkun
fsg-head
kuno
kuno
nw-DIST
]]
]]
]]
255
‘I thought it was a goanna’s head over there’ (100903-30NGUN, 0:47-0:49)256
The schematic representation of (13a) in (14a) shows the similarity between this interpretation and the257
one in (12a). The construction in (13b), represented in (14b), is analysed in detail in Spronck (2015a) and258
I will not further discuss it here.259
(14) a. [ [ ... ]reported [ -ma- + IOObjectNamed ]matrix clause ]frame−in → naming260
b. [ [ ... ]reported fragment 1 [ -ma- ]matrix [ ... ]reported fragment 2 ]frame−in → mistaken belief261
A full discussion of the constructional status of the structures schematically represented in (12) and262
(14) lies beyond the scope of the present paper, but note that the interpretation of any of the examples263
in (7-11) remains a dynamic process: individual features within an Ungarinyin frame-in construction can264
never fully disambiguate its function as either ‘say’, ‘think’ or ‘want’, and although a construction with the265
properties in, e.g., (12c) can involve reported intentions, it could equally be interpreted as reported speech or266
thought, and Ungarinyin speakers in fact frequently translate instances of this structural type as such. In the267
analysis of Rumsey (1990), the Ungarinyin language and the ideology in which it is embedded do not sharply268
distinguish between treating language as external (as in speech) and internal (as in thought or intention),269
and I believe this to be true: despite my best efforts over many years I have never been able to elicit or270
attest a spontaneously produced instance in which Ungarinyin contrasts, e.g., a ‘saying’ interpretation with271
a ‘wanting’ interpretation, of the type ,‘x said that he would come, but he wanted to stay home’, or an272
opposition between speech and thought, as in ‘x thought p but said p’. In the absence of such oppositions,273
there is no evidence that Ungarinyin speakers perceive ambiguity between these meanings.11274
For our present purposes, however, this question is tangential. What is relevant about the schematic275
representation in (12) and (14a) is, first, that the constructions they illustrate share the general form276
11Resolving the matter of monsemy/polysemy in Ungarinyin reported speech, thought and intentionality is further compli-
cated by the fact that in the contact language, Aboriginal English, the verb ‘reckon’, which shares a similar range in meaning,
is dominantly used. Although language consultants are familiar with the distinction of ‘say’, ‘think’ and ‘want’ in (Australian)
English, most spontaneous English translations of example sentences by Ungarinyin speakers are therefore also ambiguous.
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represented in (8),12 and therefore at least allow an interpretation of reported speech or thought. Second,277
the interpretations of the Ungarinyin frame-in construction, and the structural features they are associated278
with are not equal, but form an implicational hierarchy, as in (15).279
(15) speech / thought > naming / intention > causation280
Like in English, a reported addressee often remains implicit in Ungarinyin, meaning that any instance281
of a frame-in construction (with or without an expressed reported addressee) can either receive a reported282
speech or thought interpretation. The hierarchy in (15) suggests that this is not the same for all other283
functions illustrated above, however: if a reported clause is interpreted as a name, it could be interpreted as284
a naming instantiation of the frame-in construction, but also as reported speech or thought. Similarly, if a285
future tense and first person subject are used in the reported clause of an Ungarinyin frame-in construction286
(as represented in 12c), it can be translated as ‘want’, but nothing prevents it from being interpreted as287
a reported utterance or thought. Similarly, a causation interpretation can arise if the structural features288
in (12d) are present, but only then, while reported speech and thought interpretations can apply to all289
instantiations of the frame-in construction (and, as indicated, indirect causation also involves a meaning of290
intention).291
3.3. Ungarinyin as a case study of frame-in292
The Ungarinyin frame-in construction was first noted in Rumsey (1982) for its polyfunctionality and293
relative rigidity.13 It has three properties that render it particularly useful as a case study for examining294
the meaning and structural variability of frame-in syntax. First of all, while the polyfunctionality of the295
Ungarinyin construction is striking, the absence of a clear opposition between reported speech and thought296
is not uncommon in the languages of the world, and as Romaine and Lange (1991) demonstrate, even exists297
in English. Many languages in fact take the polyfunctionality much further than Ungarinyin, such as the298
Brazilian language Kwaza (isolate) in (16).299
(16) a. ‘ja
already
kui-’n˜ı-da-ki
drink-CAUS-1S-DEC
300
‘I already let (him) drink’ (lit., ±: ‘I already said: ‘let him drink!’ ’)301
b. hadai-’n˜ı-da-ki
hack-CAUS-1S-DEC
302
‘I cut myself (by accident)’14 (van der Voort, 2002: 320)303
The Kwaza example in (16a) resembles the Ungarinyin indirect causation type in (11b), and, as the304
literal translation illustrates, (16a) similarly allows an interpretation of reported speech. Example (16b),305
however, can ‘hardly be interpreted as quotative on semantic grounds’, as van der Voort (2002: 320) writes.306
Even though formally both examples in (16) appear to be equivalent, only (16a) can plausibly interpreted307
as a frame-in construction. Example (16b) likely diachronically originated as a frame-in construction, but308
cannot synchronically be interpreted as reported speech.15309
12The mistaken belief construction represented in (14b) is different in this respect: it cannot be interpreted as an unmodified
instantiation of the construction in (8), in that it simply specifies elements within the construction schema in (8). This
motivates my interpretation that only (14b) is a syntactically separate frame-in construction in Ungarinyin, while all other
examples represent different instantiation types of the frame-in construction in (8), but a full discussion of this distinction the
lies beyond the scope of the present article.
13More detailed discussions can be found in Rumsey (1990; 2001) and Spronck (2015b: ch. 3).
14The meaning ‘by accident’ derives from the absence of a reflexive morpheme. With a reflexive (16b) would mean ‘I cut
myself on purpose’ (van der Voort, 2002: 320).
15Cases of reported speech constructions developing grammatical meanings (apparently) unrelated to reported speech and
thought, such as direct causation and aspectual, modal or complementiser functions are remarkably wide-spread. For relevant
examples from three separate continents, see, for example, Larson (1978); Reesink (1993); Gu¨ldemann (2008), as well as the
other references under (4m) above.
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The Ungarinyin frame-in construction is different in this respect: despite its wide-ranging functions,310
none of its interpretations exclude reported speech or thought, and, as I will demonstrate in section 4, all311
interpretations of the Ungarinyin frame-in construction can be captured within a single definition. Therefore,312
the Ungarinyin frame-in construction is a reliable indicator of the frame-in relation: it shows a consistent313
connection between form and function.314
Second, the Ungarinyin frame-in construction is the only complex clause construction in the language315
that signals the frame-in relation.16 The diversity of reported speech constructions, for example, in English,316
distinguishing direct speech (1a) and indirected speech (1b), in addition to strategies such as adverbial clauses317
with ‘allegedly’, and variations of these, can cloud the semantic commonalities between them. Distinctions318
between types of reported speech constructions are often used to show to what extent the current speaker319
approves of the reported message, marking it as true/false, or relating it without expressing commitment,320
a classification that falls along a cline allowing varying degrees of mixing the perspectives of speakers and321
reported speakers/cognisers (De Roeck, 1994; Bugaeva, 2008; Evans, 2013).17 Ungarinyin has a single322
rigid constructional format for its frame-in construction: while elsewhere word order in the language is323
syntactically relatively unconstrained, in a frame-in construction a matrix clause consistently follows a324
reported clause, as represented in (8). The dependencies between these clauses, as signalled by deictics such325
as tense and person features, do not vary, i.e. the language does not display a direct speech-indirect speech326
opposition (Rumsey, 1982: 158). This removes a range of potentially obfuscating semantic and structural327
oppositions we may find in other languages.328
Third, the expression of the frame-in relation is relatively regular. For example, in Capell (1972), a329
published collection of Ungarinyin short stories, 62 % of the frame-in constructions have been translated330
into English with a construction that either has an alternative order between the reported and matrix331
clause, contains a different speech verb in the matrix clause, or does not contain a regular matrix clause at332
all (Spronck, 2015b: 79). The Ungarinyin frame-in construction in all these instances is consistently of the333
type in (8).334
Studying the Ungarinyin frame-in construction allows us, therefore, to assume a maximum bond between335
meaning and form, which will enable us to much more easily identify instances in which this bond is336
(apparently) violated.337
4. A definition of syntactic frame-in338
Despite the great diversity of forms with which it is expressed cross-linguistically, reported speech is a339
feature of any known language. Taking the Ungarinyin frame-in construction as benchmark of the semantic340
properties of frame-in we minimally need to account for, in this section I will attempt to characterise it in341
semantic, typologically valid terms.18342
As per the observations in sections 2 and 3, a comprehensive definition of frame-in cannot be based on343
notions such as interclausal dependency, perspective or even speech, since the involvement of these notions344
vary within and across languages. It should nonetheless be made clear, however, how such notions relate345
to a general definition of frame-in. The definition I propose will be introduced in section 4.1, along with346
a motivation for its main components. After this section, readers who are not concerned with the formal347
details of the proposed definition may want to skip forward to section 5 in which the implications of the348
definition of frame-in for Ungarinyin as well as for the exceptional features of reported speech listed in (4) are349
explored. Section 4.2 provides a formalisation of the definition of frame-in, and more detailed argumentation350
for its respective components.351
16As indicated, the exception to this claim is the mistaken belief construction in (13b), represented in (14b), which is both
formally and semantically highly distinctive (Spronck, 2015a).
17A related discussion associated with the direct-indirect speech opposition concerns the degree of ‘verbatimness’ implied
by a direct speech construction (for a detailed summary of this debate, see Vandelanotte, 2009: 118-130), which has lead
to a re-labelling of reported speech to ‘constructed discourse’ in parts of the literature on the grounds that reported speech
constructions even in English often do not reflect actual locutions (cf. Tannen, 2007, also see Spronck, 2015b: 76).
18And typological categories can only be defined in semantic terms if we are to meaningfully interpret the syntactic patterns
they are expressed by (cf. Croft, 2001; Haspelmath, 2010).
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4.1. Syntactic frame-in352
The definition of frame-in I would like to propose is that in (17). It involves three components: a dual353
semantic structure, a semiotic interpretation and a stance meaning.354
(17) Frame-in consists of355
a. an element M and an element R; structure356
b. a linguistic sign that is a symbol/index, and one that is a symbol/icon; semiotic status357
c. an evidential and a modal meaning. stance358
The features in (17) reinterpret and slightly add to the ones McGregor (1994) proposes, as summarised359
in (5). A synthesis of these features is presented in (18).360
(18) a. frame-in involves two elements, a delineating element M and a delineated element R;361
b. M and R both have a distinct semiotic status: that of an index and an icon, respectively. The362
iconic status of R accounts for its interpretation as a single discourse unit and lends it prominence363
relative to the surrounding discourse, which shows less semiotic complexity;364
c. the interpretation of R as a non-descriptive demonstration results from its semiotic status as an365
icon;366
d. frame-in involves a double modification relation;367
e. this modification relation can be deconstructed as a combination of an evidential meaning and368
a modal meaning.369
Each of these features are further examined in section 4.2 and illustrated for Ungarinyin from section 5. A370
comparison between the features in (18) and (5) above demonstrates that the definition of frame-in proposed371
here remains close to the original proposal in McGregor (1994). If the reader has a sufficient impression of372
the semantics of frame-in on the basis of the above description s/he may wish to skip forward to section 5.373
If so, two clarifications need to be made: first, for a general appreciation of frame-in, the notion of ‘icon’ in374
(17) and (18) can be read as ‘demonstration’ in the sense of Clark and Gerrig (1990) and McGregor (1994)375
(although my own interpretation slightly deviates from this characterisation). Second, following Jakobson376
(1957), I understand both evidentiality (Haßler, 2010) and modality as deictic categories in that they index377
an evidential participant and a modal participant, respectively, which stands in a conventional relation to378
the expressed proposition. The duality of M and R, the iconic status of R and the indexicality of the379
evidential/modal meaning inherent in frame-in are the minimal assumptions made in the discussion in the380
following sections about the expression of frame-in through conventional constructional or optional and/or381
extra-linguistic means.382
Below, section 4.2 defends each of the aspects of the definition of frame-in in more detail, discussing the383
dichotomy of M and R (section 4.2.1), the status of M as an index (section 4.2.2), of R as an icon (section384
4.2.3), and of both as symbols (4.2.4), and the contribution of evidentiality to frame-in (section 4.2.5) and of385
modality (section 4.2.6). The final section takes a broader look at the framework the definition of frame-in386
sets out, addressing the notion of ‘participant’ in evidential and modal meaning (section 4.2.7).387
4.2. Detailed argumentation388
In order to define frame-in as precisely as possible, I would like to propose the formalisation as in (19).19389
(19)
t0<
pE
s
Ps> [ M<
pE
ns
Pn > [ R<(p)E
n> ]]
symbol symbol
index icon
390
19The definition in (19) refines the proposal in Spronck (2012: 110), which suggested the formula ‘[[SOURCE construction]
(modal value) [MESSAGE construction]]evidential value’ to characterise reported speech constructions.
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This formula consists of three main components: the two elements M and R, which share a frame-in391
relation as in (20), a specification of the semiotic status of M and R as in (21) and a definition of evidentiality392
as a relation between a narrated event pE
n, a narrated speech event pE
ns and a current speech event pE
s
393
(22a) and a definition of modality, as a relation between a narrated event pE
n, a narrated participant Pn394
and a speech participant Ps (22b).395
(20) [ M [ R ]]396
(21)
[ M [ R ]]
symbol symbol
index icon
397
(22) a. pE
n
pE
ns/pE
s (cf. Jakobson, 1957: 135)398
b. pE
nPn/Ps (cf. Jakobson, 1957: 135)399
In the formula in (19) all variables which represent the evidential meaning and modal meaning are placed400
between crooked brackets < >, the current speech event/speech moment is symbolised by t0 and the formula401
in (22a) is slightly modified, as per (Spronck, 2015c).402
The formula in (19) states that a frame-in construction consists of an element R, which symbolically403
represents a narrated event and its participants (if relevant) and is interpreted as an icon. R is within the404
scope of an element M, which specifies the participants in the narrated speech event, and is understood to405
have an indexical relation between R and the current speech event. The combination of these properties406
builds an evidential and a modal meaning in the sense of Jakobson (1957).407
4.2.1. Frame-in consists of two elements408
While in most familiar languages M is expressed as a matrix clause and R as an embedded clause, both409
may consist of sub-clausal structures. My understanding of M is synonymous with what Gu¨ldemann (2008:410
1) labels a ‘quotative index’:411
‘A quotative index is a segmentally discrete linguistic expression which is used by the reporter412
for the orientation of the audience to signal in his/her discourse the occurrence of an adjacent413
representation of reported discourse’ (Gu¨ldemann, 2008: 11).20414
For my present purposes, M, as a ‘segmentally discrete linguistic expression’, may be a morpheme, clitic,415
particle or clause. Semantically, M has scope over R in the sense of Boye (2012: 183), in that the meaning416
of M applies to the meaning of R. As such M serves to delineate and ‘mark off’ R ‘from the surrounding417
linguistic context’ (McGregor, 1997: 66).418
The dichotomy analysis takes R as a single unit, which avoids questions about, e.g., the valency of the419
matrix verb (cf. Munro, 1982; Rumsey, 1994). Whereas the availability and status of an object argument420
is often ambiguous with a saying verb, the semantic properties of its grammatical subject are much more421
consistent. For example, Anscombre (2015: 108) defines the class of locutionary speech verbs (e.g. dire422
‘say’) on the basis of their requirement of having a locutor as their subject argument (also cf. Dor, 2005).423
In our approach, a speech verb and its subject argument are likely candidates for expressing M, because424
they are consistent with the function of M, but the status of M or R does not depend on the properties of425
a speech verb.426
20In Gu¨ldemann’s (2008) carefully constructed definitions, the term ‘reporter’ and ‘audience’ are technical terms referring
to the speaker and the addressee in the current speech situation, and ‘reported discourse’ is defined as cited below. The
provision that the quotative index (= M) is segmentally discrete is one I follow, although I understand this discreteness mostly
in semantic terms. Like Gu¨ldemann (2008), ‘I exclude purely suprasegmental features of intonation, pitch, etc., which are
also capable of marking a string of signs as a quote’ (Gu¨ldemann, 2008: 11). This decision motivates and guides much of the
approach to ‘defenestration’ from section 6. Also note that Gu¨ldemann (2008) states that the word ‘quotative’ is not to be
understood in the sense of ‘quotative evidentiality’, since the latter ‘pertains to a different functional domain’ (Gu¨ldemann,
2008: 10). Morphologically and paradigmatically this is certainly the case, but in this article I side with authors who argue
that semantically evidentiality is fundamental to our understanding of frame-in syntax.
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4.2.2. M is an indexical element427
I believe that Gu¨ldemann’s (2008) characterisation of M as an index, in the Peircian sense, is particularly428
apt, since the function of M is to point to a speech situation that is separate from the current speech moment.429
It usually introduces the reported speaker, and potentially the reported addressee as deictic elements or non-430
specific/non-specified referents.21 These indexical properties are further assigned by the evidential meaning431
that permeates a frame-in construction.432
4.2.3. R is an iconic element433
R is ‘to be viewed as a demonstration’ (McGregor, 1997: 66; Clark and Gerrig, 1990) ‘rather than434
a description’ (McGregor, 1997: 252). Unlike Clark and Gerrig (1990), who only discuss direct speech435
constructions, McGregor (1994; 1997) extends this analysis to other types of reported speech constructions436
as well, which is an interpretation I will follow here. In line with Recanati (2001) and De Brabanter (2017),437
I qualify this demonstration in Peircian semiotic terms as an icon.22438
In my interpretation, the iconic mode of language does not simply consist of a ‘less arbitrary’ type of439
sign (such as onomatopoeia), but serves to indicate that the object talked about is to be understood as440
an element of the symbolic landscape, rather than a conceptualisation of experience (Spronck, submitted).441
This interpretation of a linguistic icon allows the term to be applied to other aspects of discourse, such as442
information structure (see Spronck, submitted).443
I propose that the information status of R does not have to be taken as a defining feature of frame-in but444
that it falls out from its semiotic status. As an icon, R introduces information in the current speech context445
that should be seen as emblematic for a projected non-current speech event, which lends it a discursive446
salience that is unusual for embedded clauses.447
4.2.4. M and R are symbols448
As Jakobson (1980: 11) insists, in the original Peircian interpretation of symbols, icons and indices these449
are not separate classes of signs, but naturally co-occurring modes. As elements of language, M and R450
both necessarily also consist of a symbolic mode, i.e. of formal elements whose connection to meaning is451
conventional and arbitrary. However, the semiotic hybridity of M and R is more central to the definition452
of frame-in than this generalisation: the ability of, especially, R to be interpreted as both an icon and a453
symbol, is a defining feature of frame-in.454
Mistaken belief constructions such as (13b) show this hybridity particularly clearly: the information R455
expresses can also be commented on and used in the current speech moment as being, e.g., false in the456
estimation of the current speaker. This suggests that in some ways, R can be a regular linguistic sign, i.e.457
a symbol, that is used and not simply mentioned (cf. Saka, 1998). In my interpretation, the distinction458
between direct speech and indirect speech could be seen as signalling different degrees of mixing the iconic459
and symbolic properties of R: direct speech is mostly iconic (cf. Clark and Gerrig’s (1990) analysis that460
only direct speech is a demonstration), while indirect speech allows for symbolic interpretation.461
4.2.5. Frame-in consists of a evidential meaning462
In the analysis of McGregor (1994), M serves as a modifier casting R as a demonstration, a modification463
type McGregor (1994) characterises as evidentiality. In this view, the relation between M and R parallels464
that of the enclitic evidential marker =ami in the Saaroa (Austronesian, Kanakanavu-Saaroa) example in465
(23).466
21Many authors make a sharp distinction between reported speech constructions introducing specific reported speak-
ers/cognisers and ‘hearsay’ constructions of the type ‘they (non-specific) say’/‘it is said’, labelling one, e.g., ‘quotative’ and the
other ‘reportative’, although such labels are by no means used consistently. I do not think this is a valid distinction to qualify
entire classes of reported speech constructions, since they deal with easily defined deictic properties of M.
22Clark and Gerrig (1990) do not directly state that demonstrations and icons are the same theoretical construct, but do
point out that the two concepts share similarities (Clark and Gerrig, 1990: 765, footnote 3).
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(23) uka’a=cu=ami
NEG=COS=EVID
ka
CORE
vutukulhu
fish
m-aa
AV-be:LOC/TEMP
isana
there
467
‘It is said that there is no fish over there’ (Pan, 2015: 345)468
The morpheme =ami cliticises on the first constituent of a clause (Pan, 2015: 345), and has scope over,469
i.e. modifies, the entire clause. Example (23) would be fully grammatical without the enclitic =ami, but it470
contributes the important meaning that the clause is to be attributed to some non-specific speaker and is471
not a statement by the current speaker herself.472
I agree that frame-in constructions necessarily involve a meaning of evidentiality (Spronck, 2015a), and473
therefore share features with evidential constructions as in (23),23 but I would like to propose a minimally474
different analysis to the one McGregor (1994) puts forward: M does not modify R in the conventional475
interpretation of that term. M and R have a mutual dependency within a frame-in construction, and476
the semantic elements involved in this mutual dependence relation build an evidential meaning (also cf.477
Spronck, 2012). For lack of a better term, we may call this a modification relation, but if so, it is a478
mutual modification relation in which M modifies R just as much as R modifies M. Following the analysis479
of evidentiality in Jakobson (1957), the evidential meaning is the one represented between the top set of480
hooked brackets < > in (19). The definition of evidentiality alone is shown in (24).481
(24) pE
n
pE
ns/pE
s (cf. Jakobson, 1957: 135)482
(25) a. pE
n: the narrated event, and the participants involved in it (i.e. the reported content)483
b. pE
ns: the narrated speech event, and the participants involved in it (i.e. the reported speaker484
and addressee)485
c. pE
s: the current speech event, the participants involved in it (i.e. the speaker and addressee)486
In the pioneering account of Jakobson (1957), evidentiality consists of three variables: a narrated event,487
i.e. something talked about, roughly equivalent to a proposition; a narrated speech event, an evidential488
situation in which the current speaker (claims to have) witnessed what s/he reports on; and the current489
speech event. The deictic dependence on the current speech event, which Jakobson (1957) symbolises with490
a forward slash /, qualifies the category as a ‘shifter’ (for further discussion, see Spronck, 2015c).491
The three variables of the evidential meaning seamlessly map onto the M-R structure of the frame-in492
relation, as in (26).493
(26) t0<pE
s> [ M<pE
ns> [ R<(p)E
n> ]]494
The meaning of R corresponds to the narrated event, that of M to the narrated speech event and these495
have a deictic relation to the current speech event t0.496
4.2.6. Frame-in consists of a modal meaning497
In his definition of reported speech, Gu¨ldemann (2008) points out another aspect of frame-in (emphasis498
added):499
‘Reported discourse is the representation of a spoken or mental text from which the reporter dis-500
tances him-/herself by indicating that it is produced by a source of consciousness in a pragmatic501
and deictic setting that is different from that of the immediate discourse’ (Gu¨ldemann, 2008: 6)502
23The literature on morphological evidentiality has frequently pointed out distinctions between periphrastic reported speech
(i.e. a multi-word construction) and morphemes indicating reportativity (cf. Aikhenvald, 2004). In addition, several authors
have commented on the exceptional status of reported evidentials as opposed to, e.g., visual or inferential evidentiality: re-
portative evidentials seem to be more frequent in the languages of the world, and have the widest range of application (cf.
AnderBois, 2014; Hengeveld and Hattnher, 2015). Despite the many differences between the meaning of evidential morphemes
in languages in which the category has grammaticalised, Brugman and Macaulay (2015) find that the presence of a ‘source’ is
the only semantic property that all descriptions of evidentiality in the literature have in common. This function is reflected in
the definition in (24). But even if one would object to calling this meaning an ‘evidential meaning’, it should be uncontroversial
that Jakobson’s definition of evidentiality at least captures the semantics of reported speech as a multi-word construction.
14
The notion of ‘distancing’ is a contentious one. As Vandelanotte (2004b) shows, (English) reported503
speech constructions differ markedly in the degree to which they express ‘distance’ with respect to the504
narrated event: if M is highly subjectivising, in that it contains present tense and a first person referent505
(Verstraete, 2001), the interpretational effect is rather one of commitment strengthening, i.e. reducing506
distance (see Vandelanotte, 2004b; 2009), whereas when M is objectivising, viz. contains past tense and/or507
a third person referent, the interpretation is often one of ‘I am reporting this, but cannot vouch for the508
truth of the narrated event’. In the African languages Gu¨ldemann (2008) discusses, the person and tense509
values of M are often invariant, which means that this semantic notion of ‘distance’ can be taken a single510
parameter. But Vandelanotte’s (2004) observations demonstrate that attributing the content of R to the511
referent of M and expressing/implying an attitude towards R are two separate features. The first function512
is expressed through the evidential meaning of frame-in, the second one corresponds to the meaning of an513
other verbal category in Jakobson (1957), that of ‘mood’.24 The definition in (27) shows the Jakobsonian514
representation of mood.515
(27) pE
nPn/Ps (cf. Jakobson, 1957: 135)516
(28) a. pE
n: the participants involved in the narrated event, an event talked about517
b. Pn: narrated speech participants, participants talked about/to518
c. Ps: speech participants, the participant talking/being addressed519
In words: a modal meaning involves a narrated event, a narrated participant (i.e. something talked520
about, a proposition) who stands in a relation to the event talked about and a deictic relation with the521
current speech participant, more particularly the current speaker. This confines the modal meaning in522
reported speech to the class of speaker-related modality (Verstraete, 2002; 2007). The function of the523
narrated participant is to anchor an evaluative attitude with respect to the narrated event. In the absence524
of an explicit modal element, the specific value of this variable is left to be inferred but the idea that the525
reporting speaker may or may not concur with the reported message is crucial for the definition of reported526
speech.527
The availability of the variable further accounts for an ambiguity that may be illustrated by the English528
example in (29).529
(29) He said he would stay there, but I won’t530
The ‘but I won’t’ in (29) may either mean ‘I will not say that’ or ‘I will not stay’, i.e. in traditional531
terms, the clause either has scope over an elided element that corresponds to the embedded proposition of the532
preceding sentence or to this sentence as a whole. In our analysis, this means that the ‘I’ in the coordinated533
clause is either coreferential with the subject participant of the (evidential) narrated speech event or with534
(modal) narrated speech participant. While Ungarinyin does not allow elision of verbal elements in a similar535
way to English (cf. Rumsey, 1990), the contrast between the evidential pE
n and modal Pns can be brought536
out clearly in the language as well through the use of the discourse connective aka ‘not so’ in (30).537
(30) a. koj
koj
drink
ba
ba2-a
IMP-go
budmanangka
burr-ma-ø-nangka
3pl.S-do-PRS-3sg.IO
538
b. aka
aka
not.so
wa
wa
NEG
warda
warda
like
wanko
wanka2-w1u
3nwsg.O:1sg.S:IRR-act.on
kokoj
ko-koj
REDUP-drink
kudirri
kurr-y2i-irri
2pl-be-DU
539
amarndirri
a1-ma-ø-rndu-rri
3msg-do-PRS-3pl.IO-DU
jinda
jinda
m.PROX
540
24For our present purposes, I consider the labels ‘mood’ and ‘modal’ as synonymous. The observation that frame-in includes a
modal meaning corresponds to much of the evidence Frajzyngier (1991) adduces to demonstrate that complementation expresses
a type of modality.
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‘ “Drink,” they say. “No I don’t like it. You two can drink,” he tells them two’541
(090812JENGPDi, 1:10-1:17)542
Example (30) comes from a story in which the narrator discusses a fictional conversation between a group543
of people enticing the protagonist to drink, which the protagonist rejects. Line (30a) represents the frame-in544
construction koj ba budmanangka ‘ “Drink!” they say to him’ and (30b) shows the protagonist’s response.545
Significantly, this response starts with aka ‘not so’, contrasting the imperative koj ba ‘drink!’ as an event546
that according to the subjects referents of M in (30a) has to occur, but the reported speaker of (30b) rejects.547
In order to achieve this interpretation Ungarinyin also requires us to distinguish between the referents of M548
as the participants speaking in (30a), and as those responsible for the embedded imperative mood, i.e. to549
dissociate pE
ns from Pns. If such a dissociation was not involved, the first clause in (30b) could not mean550
‘No, I do not like to drink’: it would have to mean ‘No, I do not like saying “Drink!” ’551
4.2.7. The modal-evidential meaning in frame-in involves grammatical participation552
In the definitions of evidentiality and modality in (24) and (27) one slight modification has been made:553
the original definition of evidentiality in Jakobson (1957) states that the grammatical category signifies three554
events but presents these ‘abstracting from the participants’ involved in them, i.e. leaving out the pre-posed555
subscript ‘p’ from the E-variables.556
Bringing out the participant variables that are implicit in the representation in Jakobson (1957) fits557
within a broader framework in which grammatical categories such as aspect, mood and evidentiality are558
classified according to indexical participant types (Spronck, 2016; ms). For our present purposes, however,559
understanding the interaction between the evidential participant values and the modal participant values560
is central to the definition of frame-in: M roughly specifies the participants in the narrated speech event561
(pE
ns), and the pragmatic interaction between the participants in the narrated speech event as indicated by562
M and the participants in the current speech event ( t0<pE
s>), correspond to the deictic relation between563
Ens/Es in Jakobson (1957). R specifies the narrated event (p)E
n. This event commonly introduces one or564
more participants in full clauses with a regular argument structure. But narrated events need not necessarily565
represent full clauses (for example, when R only consists of an interjection or a discourse fragment). For566
this reason, the participants in the narrated event in R are placed between round brackets. As Vandelanotte567
(2009) demonstrates, person values, such as first person subjects in R can suggest disagreement with R on568
behalf of the current speaker (a construction type he labels ‘distancing indirect speech’).569
For every narrated speech event there is at least one evidential participant and at least one modal570
participant, and the same applies to the current speech event. The main distinction between participants571
in the evidential structure and in the modal structure is that evidentiality is about the events themselves,572
i.e. the evidential participants are understood in relation to a bounded space and time and this is essential573
to the interpretation of evidentiality. Mood is primarily about modal participants: modal participants are574
not semantically embedded in an event, but understood only in relation to the narrated event (p)E
n, i.e.575
the content towards which the modal participants hold a modal attitude. In reported speech, the modal576
participants are paired with evidential participants, and thereby become linked to the events represented577
by the evidential structure: a modal narrated speech participant in (19) expresses an attitude towards the578
narrated speech event. This participant will normally have the same referential value as the evidential579
participant in this event (e.g. the reported speaker (pE
ns), expressing, e.g., a narrated event (Pns) s/he580
holds true) or evaluates as possible or necessary. The Ps value signals how the current speaker evaluates581
either En or Ens.25 Gralow (1986) describes such a case for Coreguaje (Tucanoan, Western Tucanoan): ‘The582
enclitic -bi [counter expectation, SS] can occur within a quotation. In that case it may be used either from583
the narrator’s point of view, relating to the whole text, or merely from the point of view of the character584
25A Gricean default assumption is that if the modal value of Pns and/or Ps are left unspecified, unlike in constructions
as in (13b), the interpretation is generally that the current speaker vouches for the veridicality of the narrated event, or, at
least, does not contest it (cf. Verstraete, 2007). This implicature is probably closely related to the modal status of assertions
as statements that ‘the current speaker holds true’, a type of implicature that, Wierzbicka (2006) points out, is typical for
English, but may not be valid for many other languages.
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who is speaking at the moment. There is no overt discrimination between the two cases’ (Gralow, 1986:585
166). In order to allow for this type of flexibility in the interpretation of embedded modal meanings, a586
model of frame-in requires the modal narrated speech participant to be available as a separate variable:587
modal attitudes of the (evidential) subject participant in the narrated speech event may be dissociated588
from those of the (modal) narrated speech participant, and modal attitudes of the current speaker may589
be contrasted to those of the narrated speech participant. Following Evans (2006), the complexity of such590
multiple-perspective meanings is increasingly receiving typological attention (e.g. San Roque and Bergqvist,591
2015, also see Spronck, 2015c).592
The crucial point is that the grammatical participants involved in the evidential and modal meanings593
can be indexed through a variety of grammatical means. Pronouns are a typical strategy for doing so, but594
particles, adverbs and illocutionary force are no less common strategies for indexing participation.26 A notion595
that comes close to this analysis is that of ‘protagonist projection’, the idea that certain lexemes presuppose596
a (subject) entity of a particular type (e.g. Stokke, 2013; Buckwalter, 2014). Protagonist projection has597
been proposed to be part of the semantics of predicates of personal taste (e.g. ‘nice’, ‘fun’, ‘stupid’), which598
presuppose an entity whose taste it expresses (Lasersohn, 2005), and in a similar way of the semantics of599
epistemic modality (e.g. ‘maybe’, ‘might’) (Stephenson, 2007; Schaffer, 2009), which presuppose an entity600
making an epistemic evaluation. Similar analyses can be made of other elements belonging to what Potts601
(2007) calls the ‘expressive dimension’, such as interjections. Participant values in the evidential and/or602
modal meaning may coincide with referential persons in the current speech event or narrated (speech) event,603
but should not be conflated with them: they are conventionalised linguistic values that are necessarily604
implied by the evidential/modal semantic structure, and can be signalled by a variety of linguistic means.605
5. Discussion606
The de facto exceptionality of reported speech has been recognised by many syntacticians. Noting the607
idiosyncrasy of direct speech, Mittwoch (1985: 151) concludes: ‘The only feasible solution that I can envisage608
is one that treats [direct speech] as syntactically sui generis.’ However, this solution leaves the exceptionality609
of reported speech constructions other than direct speech unaddressed. Within Role and Reference Grammar610
Van Valin and LaPolla (1997: 479ff) posit ‘indirect speech’ (defined as ‘an expression of reported speech’)611
as a separate interclausal relation type, among a range of other types. Although this includes a larger range612
of sentential constructions than in Mittwoch’s (1985) analysis, it leaves out non-clausal types of reported613
speech, such as morphologically or adverbially signalled M. In Functional Discourse Grammar Hengeveld614
and Mackenzie (2008) analyse the representational semantics of a reported message such as “(that) Sheila615
is ill” as a complement or argument of the speech verb ‘to say’ (Hengeveld and Mackenzie, 2008: 103), but616
the matrix clause as carrying a separate intersubjective meaning, specified at the Illocutionary Level. This617
dual status accounts for the idiosyncrasy of reported speech (Hengeveld and Mackenzie, 2008: 276). At618
the Illocutionary Level Keizer (2015: 209-210) classifies the complements of English speech verbs as either619
‘discourse moves’ (‘the smallest identifiable unit of communicative behaviour Keizer, 2015: 52) or ‘speech620
events’. This is a more flexible approach, but the analysis loosens assumptions about the relation between621
meaning and form, which makes it more difficult to account for the distinctive features of reported speech622
as a class of constructions.623
An account that comes closest to the radical proposal by McGregor (1994) that reported speech forms624
a separate syntactic class, is Speas (2004), who, building on Cinque (1999) formulates an explicit proposal625
for the syntactic status of evidentiality, as expressed in reported speech (also see Etxepare, 2008).27 As an626
exponent of the formal syntactic tradition, Speas (2004) posits reported speech/evidentiality as a syntactic627
node, without further addressing the semantics involved. From the perspective of a semiotic functionalist628
26Also see Verstraete (2000; 2007) on the interaction between modal source/authority and illocution, Bergqvist (2012) on
the interaction between epistemic/evidential authority and declaratives/interrogatives.
27Speas (2004) specifically calls this syntactic node ‘evidential’, but the examples in the paper almost exclusively involve
reported speech. This is another parallel with McGregor (1994), who makes explicit that reported speech carries an evidential
meaning.
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analysis, as represented by McGregor (1994), this is a just-so story, since it does not attempt to examine629
how the meanings involved in reported speech relate to structural expression.630
In section 5.1 I apply the definition of frame-in posited in section 4 to Ungarinyin, illustrating how the631
meanings introduced map onto the Ungarinyin reported speech construction. Section 5.2 addresses each of632
the exceptional features of reported speech listed in (4) and suggests how the proposed definition of frame-in633
accounts for them.634
5.1. Ungarinyin frame-in635
The Ungarinyin frame-in construction in (7), repeated below as (31) for convenience, expresses the636
meaning of frame-in in a conveniently transparent way.637
(31) [[
[[
[[
mindi-mindi
mindi-mindi
nm.anaph-redup
mangkay
mangkay
remain
ngima
nga1-y2i-ma
1sg-fut-do
]
]
]
amara
a1-ma-ra
3msg-do-pst
]
]
]
638
‘ “I will stay here”, he said’/‘He thought (that) he would stay there’/‘He wanted to stay here” etc.639
The two elements M and R invariably have the same conventional order in Ungarinyin: R precedes M. In640
(31), R consists of an expression of the narrated event mindi-mindi mangkay ngima ‘I will stay right here’,641
and M of the standard matrix verb amara ‘he said/did’, expressing a narrated speech event with a third642
person masculine subject. The current speaker produces the utterance (31) in the current speech event,643
thereby completing the three event components of the evidential meaning in the sense of Jakobson (1957).644
The indexical symbol status of M is established by its role of indexing the reported speaker. The645
iconic symbol status of R is structurally signalled by its constructional appearance as a single unit, and646
the observation that it frequently has a separate prosodic status (Spronck, 2015b: 87). The iconic feature647
of R allows us to state the difference between the ‘say’, ‘think’ and ‘want’ in more precise terms: for648
‘say’ and ‘think’ interpretations (i.e. more prototypical frame-in interpretations), R is more clearly iconic649
than for ‘want’ interpretations, where R does not ‘stand for’ real world expression. Interestingly, frame-in650
constructions with a speech/thought interpretation appear to show a sharper prosodic distinction between651
the onset of R and M than those with a ‘want’ interpretation, possibly reflecting the lower iconic status of652
the latter (Spronck, 2016: 260–262). Whether we accept this as sufficient evidence for positing the ‘want’653
interpretation as a separate construction type is open to debate.28654
The definition of frame-in brings into focus how the respective interpretations of the Ungarinyin frame-in655
construction are related, and where they may differ, a question for which the relation between the modal656
narrated participant Pn and the evidential narrated speech participant is also relevant. In (31), the modal657
meaning of frame-in is reflected by two referential elements: it involves the subject of M as the narrated658
participant, but also the coreferential subject of the narrated event (p)E
n, and, of course, the speaker in the659
current speech event, completing the Jakobsonian three-way structure of mood (see section 4.2.6). In case of660
a ‘want’ interpretation, two conditions need to be satisfied: the modal value of the narrated participant (‘he’,661
in 31) cannot remain unspecified, it needs to be clear that the narrated participant wants the narrated event662
to come about. Ungarinyin expresses this with a deontically interpreted future tense. Second, the ‘want’663
interpretation of frame-in can only arise if at least the evidential and modal participants associated with664
the narrated event and the narrated speech event are co-indexical (also see Spronck, 2015c). Ungarinyin665
fulfills this condition with an obligatory first person referent in the narrated event (p)E
n, which signals666
coreferentiality with the subject of M.667
Although the assumption that the entity reporting and the entity believing in the validity of the narrated668
event are separable is a defining feature of frame-in, only in the mistaken belief construction in (13b) is the669
dissociation between the current speaker as an evidential participant (presenting the narrated event through670
a narrated speech event) and modal participant (evaluating the narrated event as untrue) made explicit.671
28As indicated in section 3.3, I do not believe that Ungarinyin speaker intuitions suggest that the respective interpretations
are perceived as semantic oppositions in the language, but this is an open theoretical question.
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The definition of frame-in purports to specify a set of semantic variables that can be given values in a given672
construction, but all the observed variation in the interpretation of frame-in should be explainable on the673
basis of the semantic parameters set in section 4.674
The components of the semantic representation of frame-in in (19) are intrinsically intertwined. As675
shown, the M-R dichotomy coincides with a semiotic index-icon opposition, and M also matches a narrated676
speech event/narrated participant complex and R a narrated event. However, the contribution of these677
components to the interpretation of a construction may vary independently: this was illustrated for the678
‘want’ interpretation in Ungarinyin, where there the modal narrated participant is more prominent and the679
iconic status of R is less prominent, and the reverse analysis can be applied to the naming interpretation680
in (13a), in which the meaning of R as an icon is prominent, but the contribution of the modal narrated681
participant is mostly irrelevant.682
The cross-linguistic hypothesis that frame-in suggests is the assumption that the value of each of the683
individual elements in the semantic structure identified in (19) may vary with respect to any other, resulting684
in a potentially wide range of constructions. The semantic range of this variation is set by the variables685
in (19), however, meaning that reported speech constructions (such as direct, indirect and bi-perspectival686
speech Evans, 2013) may be contrasted with respect to their modal or evidential value, semiotic status or687
simply the way in which they signal M.688
5.2. Accounting for the exceptionality of reported speech689
The definition of frame-in introduced in section 4 allows us to account for all of the idiosyncracies listed690
in (4).691
First of all, several observations about the nature of the frame-in relation itself are addressed by Mc-692
Gregor’s (1994) original proposal that frame-in is a syntactic relation in its own right. The high degree of693
indeterminacy in the dependence relation matrix and reported clauses display (4a), the fact that (in En-694
glish) this relation can remain (relatively) stable if the order of clausal elements is changed (4c) and, again695
in English, that an ‘embedded’ clause can be interpolated with the matrix clause (4d), are all remarkable696
because coordinate and subordinate clauses cannot normally display these features. If we stipulate syntactic697
frame-in as a syntactic class in its own right, these observations can simply be seen as properties of the698
expression of frame-in (in English).29 Within the definition of frame-in M and R mutually define each other,699
which lends them both relative autonomy and dependence. If a language expresses M and R as clausal units,700
relative order seems to be a likely source for pragmatically or semantically driven constructional variation,701
but, as the rigidity in the order of Ungarinyin frame-in constructions shows, this need not be the case.702
Adopting frame-in as a separate syntactic relation also can more easily account for the observation that703
a frame-in relation may exist between multiple clauses (4g), or between a clause and a subclausal unit (4i).704
Frame-in casts its R as an icon, and in some languages this iconic unit may consist of several clauses, or705
even of a non-clausal element.706
Three of the features listed in (4) involve the lexical properties of verbs appearing in M, more particularly707
the observation that frame-in constructions may permit certain island constraint violations (4h), have atyp-708
ical transitivity patterns (4j) and can display a remarkable degree of polyfunctionality (4m). The definition709
in section 4 allows us to relate all these aspects to the evidential meaning of frame-in.710
The concept of ‘island constraints’ stems from traditional generative grammar, where it demonstrates711
that ‘movement’ of elements from the underlying logical structure may be ‘blocked’ by certain units, labelled712
‘syntactic islands’. A typical example is shown in (32), where in (32b) the clause ‘Mary broke the table’713
blocks the interrogative from moving out of the sentence ‘Dean was going to buy what in the supermarket’,714
whereas, the recursively embedding (32a) is fully acceptable.715
(32) a. What did Eve say that Mary thought that Bill told her that Dean was going to buy in the716
supermarket?717
29Note that this does not mean that these different forms of a frame-in construction are (necessarily) fully synonymous,
simply that they are all instantiations of frame-in. For example, Verhagen (2016a) finds that preposing, versus a postposing M
with respect to R in Dutch and English results in subtle differences in interpretation (related to the modal meaning expressed
towards R).
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b. *What did Eve say that Mary broke the table that Bill told her that Dean was going to buy in718
the supermarket? (Dor, 2015: 143)719
Arguing against an explanation based on syntactic constraints, Dor (2015) explains the difference in720
grammaticality in (32) by stating that the predicate ‘say’ in (32a) entails the existence of an epistemic721
agent, as do the other matrix clause verbs, which therefore indicate that the embedded clauses involve an, in722
Dor’s terminology, ‘epistemic eventuality’. In (32b), however, this scope pattern is disrupted by a clause with723
the verb ‘to break’, which has a subject role that is not consistent with the epistemic agent type projected724
by the matrix verb and therefore cannot itself head a matrix clause that has scope over a construction that725
requires an epistemic agent.726
If we equate the notion of ‘epistemic agent’ to the participant in the evidential narrated speech event,727
we can restate this analysis using the approach to frame-in I have outlined. Frame-in involves an evidential728
participant structure in which a reported speaker is indexed as well as a narrated speech event. Irrespective729
of whether we adopt a theoretical approach in which ‘what’ in the first position in (32a) is moved out of an730
embedded clause, it refers to some object in the narrated event En ‘Dean will buy x in the supermarket’.731
If we interpret (32a) as a frame-in construction with a complex M ‘Eve said that Mary thought that Bill732
told her that’ and the R ‘Dean will buy x in the supermarket’, the entire complex structure in (32a) is an733
expression of a single semantic frame-in structure. As Dor (2015: 143) argues, (32b) does not express the734
participant structure required for the expression of an evidential meaning, and therefore cannot represent735
a frame-in construction. In English, verbs such as ‘say’, ‘think’ and ‘tell’ are lexemes that are semantically736
consistent with an M. English ‘break’ cannot be used to specify a narrated speech event in M.737
This interpretation of the relation between the syntax and lexical structure of frame-in can also be applied738
to the observation that verbs such as ‘say’ display highly irregular transitivity patterns (4j): following the739
representation of Jakobson (1957) the evidential meaning consists of three events with associate participants,740
with clearly defined interrelations, but no shared event structure in the sense that, e.g., a participant in the741
narrated speech event (the reported speaker) performs an action on a participant in the narrated event (an742
argument in the reported message). While the semantic structure of frame-in involves multiple participants,743
each of the events involved (the current speech/thought event, the narrated speech/thought event and the744
narrated event) can be represented as mono- or even non-valent (e.g. a single speaker/cogniser and an745
intransitive/verbless narrated event). This semantic structure may explain the cross-linguistic variation in746
the valency of verbs appearing in M: the Ungarinyin root -ma- ‘say, think, do’ is morphologically intransitive,747
an English verb like ‘say’ is normally transitive.748
The relation between the polyfunctionality of M clauses cross-linguistically and the evidential meaning749
of frame-in is slightly more speculative, but here the representation of evidentiality in Jakobson (1957) offers750
a potential avenue. Within the ‘calculus’ of verbal categories in Jakobson (1957), all other grammatical751
categories in the system can be derived from the event and participant structure used in evidential meaning.752
Within this approach, Spronck (2016) discusses a scenario of how evidential meaning may lead to modal,753
causal and aspectual meanings.754
The evidential meaning further accounts for the occurrence of the deictic shift in frame-in (4e), since the755
deictic properties of reported speech indicate a relation between the narrated speech event and the current756
speech event, a relation Jakobson (1957) qualifies as a ‘shifter’. As De Roeck (1994) shows, languages differ757
significantly in the types of deictic elements involved in expressing this shifter relation.758
The recurrent modal (4k) and evidential effects (4l) attested in reported speech can be characterised as759
specifications or highlighting of aspects of the modal and evidential semantic structure, respectively. For a760
fuller discussion of these effects, see Spronck (2015c).761
With respect to the information status of R, the embedded/subordinated clause in frame-in constructions762
is unusually prominent (4b). I suggest that the explanation of this is two-fold: on the one had it falls out from763
the semiotic status of R as an icon, which causes it to stand out from its less iconic discourse context. But,764
perhaps more importantly, the expectation that the ‘subordinated’ clause in a reported speech construction765
has a peculiar information status follows from the analysis that R represents a dependent element. Within766
the proposed definition of frame-in, R is not any more dependent on M than M is on R.767
Finally, frame-in appears able to be signalled non-clausally (4f), to the extent that it seemingly can768
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involve ‘semi-conventional’ multimodality (4n). This is an aspect that requires closer examination, and I769
will do so in the context of the phenomenon of defenestration that I will investigate in the remainder of this770
paper.771
6. Ungarinyin defenestration772
6.1. Optionality and syntactic frame-in773
Having defined the semantics of frame-in allows us to more closely examine the ways in which these774
semantic elements are structurally expressed. As indicated in section 2, the semantics of reported speech775
are expressed through a range of often rather idiosyncratic forms. But, specifically, I would like to address776
a cross-linguistic phenomenon in the expression of reported speech that so far has eluded systematic, struc-777
tural description: the pervasiveness of utterances that seemingly express the meaning of regular frame-in778
constructions, but do not explicitly mark elements of M, such as a reported speaker.30 The core properties779
of frame-in identified in section 4 provide a broader perspective for such utterances, as examples of frame-in780
in which part of the semantic structure in (19) are left unspecified. This approach allows us to ask which781
elements necessarily receive structural expression in frame-in constructions, and which parts of the seman-782
tic structure of frame-in could be treated as ‘optional’ (cf. McGregor, 2013). Parallel to Evans’s (2007)783
notion of insubordination (the phenomenon in which the main clause of a subordinate clause construction784
is elided, either dynamically, i.e. synchronically, or as part of a diachronic process), I label instances in785
which essential parts of the semantic structure of the frame-in relation, typically of M, remain unexpressed786
or underexpressed defenestration.31 I submit that the notion of defenestration allows us to develop787
an integrated approach to optionality in frame-in and to more systematically evaluate the contribution of788
multimodality in the expression of reported speech and thought than most current approaches allow us789
to do. Recent proposals describing reported speech as a multimodal construction (e.g. Lampert, 2013a;b;790
Blackwell et al., 2015; Stec et al., 2015) capture an essential aspect of these constructions, namely, that791
meaning making in frame-in constructions involves a more holistic range of markers than many other simple792
and complex clausal constructions. But, as Stec et al. (2015) find, the multimodal signals involved in this793
meaning making process are loosely conventionalised at best, and are frequently omitted in the presence of794
contextual cues that help identify, e.g., a particular reported speaker or indicate that an utterance is to be795
interpreted as a reported message.796
My main claim here will be that this type of semi-conventional or extra-linguistic signalling can only797
been appropriately interpreted if we can first reliably identify what aspects of reported speech and thought798
are conventional. For our present purposes Ungarinyin presents an ideal case study since the language has799
one structure for expressing reported speech that can be related (despite subtle semantic variation) to one800
single semantic structure, as discussed in the previous sections. In the remainder of this paper I aim to801
demonstrate that defenestration phenomena should not be treated as a rather random set of extra-linguistic802
means of expression, but as alternative ways of specifying frame-in.803
6.2. Reported speech without a frame-in construction804
The construction outlined in (8) is the only fully grammatical structure available in Ungarinyin for805
expressing the frame-in relation. This does not mean, however, that it is always used to express the mean-806
ing of frame-in. Since the Ungarinyin frame-in construction is easily identified, the phenomenon I have807
labelled defenestration above is therefore entirely transparent in the language: Ungarinyin defenestration808
is represented by any expression of reported speech, thought or intentionality that does not include a full809
30These types of utterances have been widely discussed under the label of ‘free (in)direct speech’ or ‘zero quotatives’, but
both of these categories are highly problematic.
31The nod to insubordination should not be taken to imply that defenestration is (necessarily) an instance of insubordination.
There are similarities, but also many differences between the phenomena described in Evans (2007) and defenestration as
introduced here.
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-ma-construction as in (8).32 Using this practical definition of defenestration, I distinguish two basic types:810
external defenestration (section 6.2.1) and internal defenestration (section 6.2.2). After outlining these, in811
section 6.2.3 I briefly discuss how defenestration is interpreted and speculate that the two types correspond812
to a small range of highly similar phenomena across languages.813
6.2.1. External defenestration: perspectivising clauses814
The clauses between square brackets in (33a) and (33b) represent a narrated speech event, but both815
examples lack a conventional M-clause.816
(33) a. balya
balya
go
bungoni
bunga2-w1u-ni
3pl.O:1sg.S-act.on-PST
[
[
[
anjaku
anja-ku
what-DAT
murlnbun
murlnbun
argue
kujilennyina
kurr-y1ila-n-y1i-na
2pl-hold-PRS-REFL-PAUC
]
]
]
... ngin
ngin
1sg
817
‘I went to them. “Why are you arguing with each other?”... Me’ 33818
b. di
di
nw.ANAPH
marda
marda
walk
ayirri
a1-a-ø-yirri
3msg-go-PRS-CONT
[
[
[
ngamara
nga1-ma-ra
1sg-do-PST
ngurr
ngurr
kill
ngurrumernangka
nga1-irra2-ma-ra-nangka
1sg-DEFS-do-PST-3sg.IO
]
]
]
...819
ngala
ngala
animal
jina
jina
m.PROX
mardumarl
mardumarl
long.neck.turtle
820
‘Then he is walking. “I did it, I killed it” the long neck turtle [said]’ (Coate, 1970)821
The defenestrated reported speech clause anjaku murlnbun kujilenyina ‘why are you arguing with each822
other?’ in (33a) is preceded by the clause balya bungoni ‘I went to them’, which introduces as its grammatical823
subject the reported speaker to whom the following reported speech clause is to be attributed. Instead of824
an M-clause (which would be part of the same prosodic sentence and include the M-verb -ma- ‘say, do’), the825
speaker inserts a pause after the reported message and, like an afterthought, adds the single pronoun ngin826
‘I’, clarifying the identity of the reported speaker. The form of the sequence in (33b) is fully equivalent: it827
starts with the motion clause di mardu ayirri ‘then he is walking’, is followed by the defenestrated reported828
message clause ngamara ngurr ngurrumernangka ‘I did it, I killed him’, a pause and a specification of the829
reported speaker.34830
We may distinguish two other types of defenestrated clauses in addition to the one illustrated above, one831
of these is shown in (34a) and (34b).832
(34) a. nyinda
nyinda
f.PROX
wurla
wurla
talk
on
a1-w1u-n
3msg.O:3sg.S-act.on-PRS
yirrkalngarri
yirrkalngarri
policeman
[
[
[
balya
balya
go
bumalu
ba2-ma=lu
IMP-do=PROX
]
]
]
833
‘She tells the policeman to come’834
b. dubulangarri
dubulangarri
red
buk
buk
come.out
biyengkangarri
birr-a-ngka2-ngarri
3pl-go-PST-SUB
... ngayak
ngayak
ask
nyumarni
nya2-ma-rni
3fsg.O:3sg.S-take-PST
[
[
[
nyangkiku
nyangki-ku
who-DAT
835
jinda
jinda
m.PROX
... yila
yila
child
]
]
]
836
32Ungarinyin shows one regular exception to the construction with the matrix verb -ma- ‘do’ in reciprocal saying events, i.e.
‘x and y said to (-inga-) each other’, in which case the verb is replaced by -inga- ‘put’, as, e.g., in example (37e). I do not
consider this an instance of defenestration (but see section 6.2.2).
33A transcription of the entire story can be found in Spronck (2015b).
34Rumsey (2010: 1662) cites a very similar strategy in Bunuba (Bunaban), although that language shows slightly more
variation in its frame-in constructions.
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‘When the red [child] was born, he asked her ‘Whose child is that?’ ’35837
In (34), the reported speech elements are again indicated between brackets, but the preceding clauses838
carry a meaning that is more directly relevant to the reported speech interpretation than the motion verbs in839
(33). While the subject of the clauses immediately preceding the defenestrated clause, again, introduces the840
reported speaker of the defenestrated clause, it also lexically specifies the defenestrated clause as representing841
a reported speech event: the clause nyinda wurla on yirrkalngarri ‘she talks to/calls on the police’ (34a)842
sets the following clause up as the product of talking or calling, and ngayak nyumarni ‘he asked her’ in843
(34b) introduces an interrogative speech act. Both (34a) and (34b) have a different illocutionary value844
in the introductory clause and in the defenestrated clause, a feature I will label ‘illocutionary change’,845
and one they share with (33a). Illocutionary change creates a contrast between the introductory clause846
and the defenestrated clause, contributing to the demarcation of the latter. The fragments following the847
defenestrated clause and identifying the reported speaker in (33) are absent in (34).848
The third type of external defenestration is illustrated in (35a). It consists of a ‘psych action’ verb,849
followed by a defenestrated clause which could either represent a thought or a locution. It also shows850
illocutionary change to an imperative and contains an interjection to further mark the boundary between851
the introductory clause di mara andon ‘then he sees them’.852
(35) a. di
di
nw-ANAPH
mara
mara
see
andon
anda2-w1u-n
3pl.O:3sg.S-act.on-PRS
[
[
[
a
a
ah
diyali
di-y2ali
nw.ANAPH-indeed
buma
ba2-ma
IMP-do
]
]
]
853
‘And then he sees them. “Ah, that’s how you should do it” ’ (Coate, 1966: 110, line 112)854
b. bandu
bandu
3pl.AMBIPH
buna
buna
3pl.PROX
wurrngijanyirri
wurr-ngija-n-yirri
3nwsg.O:3pl.S-wonder-PRS-CONT
[[
[[
[[
anjaku
anja-ku
what-DAT
dambun
dambun
camp
ruluk
ruluk
shift
855
mumanganyirri
ma2-ma-nga-yirri
3nmsg.O:3sg.S-take-PST-CONT
dowanda
dowan-da
one.side-LOC
]
]
]
budmerri
burr-ma-ra-rri
3pl-do-PST-DU
bunda
bunda
3pl.PROX
balangkarra
balangkarra
people
]
]
]
856
‘They are wondering about it. “Why did he shift his camp to one side?” those people said’857
(Coate, 1966: 110, lines 119–120)858
As (35b) shows, the elements used in defenestration are not incompatible with a full frame-in construction.859
In (35b), the frame-in construction is preceded by the psych action clause bandu buna wurrngijanyirri ‘they860
are wondering about it’ and R shows illocutionary change with respect to the introductory clause and M.861
Also, the position immediately preceding the frame-in construction is often used to specify either properties862
of the narrated speech event (as, e.g., asking, shouting, wondering), or referential properties of the reported863
speaker. For example, in (36), the phrase yirranangka jinda ‘this father’ preceding the frame-in construction864
lexically specifies the subject of M amanangka walawi ‘he said to his son’.36865
(36) yirranangka
yirra-nangka
father-3sgPOSS
jinda
jinda
3m.PROX
... [[
[[
[[
balu
ba2-a=lu
IMP-go=PROX
]
]
]
amanangka
a1-ma-ø-nangka
3msg.S-do-PRS-3sg.IO
walawi
walawi
son
]
]
]
866
‘His father, he says “Come” to his son’ (090812JENGPDi, 1:42-145)867
35This passage comes from an allegorical story about red snakes and black snakes, with a black father discovering that his
wife has given birth to a red (i.e. non-Aboriginal) child.
36Since Ungarinyin rarely expresses both the subject and (indirect) object referents of a predicate as full lexical elements
within the same construction (cf. Du Bois, 1987), the position immediately preceding R can be used to specify referential
properties of the grammatical subject of M if the addressee is also lexically specified.
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The defenestration introductory clauses in (33) correspond to what Verstraete (2011: 498) calls ‘perspec-868
tivising clauses’. These ‘are different from typical [M] [...] in that they are not explicitly metalinguistic but869
simply describe a non-linguistic event in the narrative’, yet, ‘they put a specific participant into perspective870
and thus anticipate a shift to their speech or thought’ (Verstraete, 2011: 498–499). The rigidity of frame-in871
constructions in Ungarinyin allows us to define this class as a slightly broader type: unlike, e.g., in English,872
Ungarinyin does not allow M-clauses to precede R, so any clause introducing the reported message (p)E
n
873
serves to anticipate the perspective shift in the defenestrated clause or in R. For their functional similarity874
with M-clauses I will refer to these introductory clauses as little-m. As examples (34) and (35) demon-875
strate, little-m clauses may include metalinguistic meanings, specifying properties about the narrated speech876
event, such as manner of speech or illocutionary type, which Ungarinyin M-clauses, which can only contain877
the verb -ma- ‘say/do’, do not allow to specify lexically themselves. Little-m clauses therefore identify878
elements of the narrated speech event, most importantly the reported speaker pE
ns, which creates a context879
in which M-clauses can be omitted, although in Ungarinyin they frequently are not.880
Although the defenestration patterns illustrated above are restricted to these three types of little-m881
clauses, these clauses themselves show little a priori semantic or structural coherence. This is exactly the882
point: little-m clauses remain independent sentential units, with no syntactic dependencies between the883
little-m and defenestrated clauses. They are not a type of M in Ungarinyin in the sense that they form a884
frame-in construction with the following R. The distinction becomes particularly clear when we compare885
little-m and M: while both can be left out given the appropriate context (also see section 6.2.2), speakers of886
Ungarinyin will often characterise a defenestrated clause as incomplete, and supplement the defenestrated887
clause with an M-clause when examples are played back to them. This is not the case for little-m. As888
indicated, little-m clauses are not restricted to a specific matrix verb, or even the class of speech/cognition889
verbs. Although little-m loosely follows a general convention about relative position with respect to the890
narrated speech event representing clause (preceding, rather than following it, as in the case of M) and the891
subject referent of little-m indexes a reported speaker similar to M, the conventionalised relation between892
little-m and a defenestrated clause is quite different from that between R and M in a frame-in construction.893
While the latter mutually signal each other as members of the frame-in relation, a defenestrated clause is894
understood as R, and is thereby associated with a full frame-in relation as defined in (19). The properties895
of M, expressing an indexical relation to the evidential narrated speech participant and the modal narrated896
participant, and delimiting R are evoked through the conventional constructional meaning of frame-in, but897
not expressed through conventional syntactic means. In defenestration M is treated as an optional element898
in the sense of McGregor (2013): ‘the construction remains unchanged as a linguistic sign regardless of899
whether or not the element is present’ (McGregor, 2013: 1152). However, because the full constructional900
meaning of frame-in becomes available as soon as a defenestrated clause is interpreted as R, the unexpressed901
properties of M become associated with an indexed entity that is consistent with the meaning of M that has902
already been introduced in the discourse. This is the function of little-m clauses.903
The traditional analysis of patterns such as those formed by little-m and defenestrated clauses is that904
they are a matter of style rather than syntax (Banfield, 1982: 231). I believe that this view is fundamentally905
correct. Two conclusions that are not warranted, I believe, are that these patterns show that reported speech906
is therefore mostly ‘a rhetorical strategy with motivations in interpersonal relations and online discourse907
management’ (D’Arcy, 2015: 57) or that such patterns constitute ‘a relatively new technique, which fully908
developed in the context of writing in the 20th century’ (Foolen and Yamaguchi, 2016: 194). Little-m clauses909
are not a syntactic device, and lack the structural conventionalisation of an M clause, as demonstrated by910
the types of predicates and clause types involved. However, what defines them as a type is that in the911
absence of an M clause they provide the semantic values for the conventional variables of frame-in that912
require an interpretation: What matters for the form and interpretation of little-m clauses is the contrast913
between the little-m clause and the defenestrated clause. This contrast is formed in (33-35) by illocutionary914
change, but the introductory and defenestrated clauses in these examples often also display a contrast in915
tense present/past (33b) (also in the full frame-in construction in 35b), past/present in (33a) and the verbless916
defenestrated clause in (34b), and present/non-present in the imperative defenestrated clauses in (34a) and917
(35a). The referential properties of little-m clauses help identify a reported speaker, the contrast between918
the little-m and defenestrated clauses signals the semiotic status of the defenestrated clause. Boundary919
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marking is essential to the interpretation of reported speech and thought (Besnier, 1993; Glenister Roberts,920
2004), since it sets apart the reported message clause from the immediate context, signalling its semiotic921
status as an icon.37 One of the most obvious ways of doing this is through prosody (Couper-Kuhlen, 1998)922
and through more idiosyncratic supra-segmental means (such as voice quality), but little-m clauses can serve923
to perform this function in Ungarinyin quite effectively.924
Little-m clauses exemplify external defenestration, since elements that are normally expressed through925
elements within the frame-in construction, are specified by elements outside the defenestrated clause. Un-926
garinyin has other non-syntactic ways of satisfying conditions in which M can be left out without causing927
difficulty for interpretation: internal defenestration relies on elements within the defenestrated clause to928
signal a reported speech or thought meaning.929
6.2.2. Internal defenestration930
The exchange in (37) below illustrates multiple clause relationality, the phenomenon in which one M has931
scope over multiple R, and one of the idiosyncracies of reported speech pointed out by McGregor (1994). The932
M in this brief dialogue is the reciprocal speech clause bidningengkerri ‘they said to each other’ in (37e), and933
over the two preceding lines the identity of the reported speaker changes: (37b) and (37c) are understood to934
be spoken by nyina nyalwangarri ‘the old woman’ specified in the little-m clause nyina nyalwangarri buluba935
nyangka ‘this old woman was looking around’ in (37a). The following reported message in (37d) is spoken by936
another, unidentified reported speaker. Although (37) is strictly not an instance of defenestration, given the937
presence of an M-clause, it does contain a change in perspective that is not directly signalled by a specific938
M. Unlike with the examples of external defenestration discussed above, the little-m in (37) cannot explain939
the shift to the reported speaker of (37d) since the subject of the little-m clause in (37a) is not coreferential940
with it. What allows the seemingly unmarked shift in (37d) to be interpreted?941
(37) a. nyina
nyinda
f.PROX
nyalwangarri
ny-alwa-ngarri
fsg-old-NMLZ
buluba
buluk-w1a
look.around-ITRV
nyangka
nya2-a-ngka
3fsg-go-PST
...942
‘This old woman was looking around’943
b. [[
[[
[[
manjarn
manjarn
stone
nyangki
nyangki
who
rimij
rimij
steal
wudmanira
wurr-ma-ni-ra
3nwsg.O:3pl.S-take-PST-1sg.IO
kanda
kanda
nm.PROX
narnburr ...
narnburr
paperbark
944
‘ “Who stole my coins and banknotes?’945
c. nyingankarra
nyingan=karra
2sg=maybe
rimij
rimij
steal
wunjumanira
wunja2-ma-ni-ra
3nwsg.O:2sg.S-take-PST-1sg.IO
...946
‘Maybe you’re the one stealing my things” ’947
d. anjaku
anja-ku
what-DAT
rimij
rimij
steal
nginkenungarri
ngin-w2a2-y2i-ø-nu-ngarri
1sg.S-IRR-be-PRS-2sg.IO-SUB
ngin
ngin
1sg
maji
maji
must
buluba
buluk-ba2-a
look.around-ITRV
948
wura
wa2-ra
3nwsg.O-go.to
jadarn
jadarn
properly
... ]
]
]
949
‘ “Why would I steal from you? Why would I rob you? You should look around for it properly” ’950
37Hickman (1993) finds that in the acquisition of English reported speech constructions, the ability to use boundary marking
strategies between M and R comes relatively late, which is characteristic for the imperfect realisation of reported speech
constructions by young children.
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e. bidningengkerri
birr-ninga-y1i-ngka2-yirri
3pl-put-REFL-PST-CONT
]
]
]
951
‘they said to each other’952
The shift in perspective in (37d) is supported by at least one strategy already introduced above: illo-953
cutionary contrast. Following the statement by the reported speaker of (37c), the question anjaku rimij954
nginkenungarri ngin ‘why would I be stealing from you?’ signals the initial boundary of the reported mes-955
sage. Illocutionary contrast cannot fully explain the perspective shift, however, since the following imperative956
clause maji buluk ba wura jadarn ‘try to look for it properly’/‘you should look around for it properly’ does957
not coincide with a change in reported speaker.38958
A strategy that more directly contributes to the interpretation of perspective change in (37d) is ‘res-959
onance’ in terms of Du Bois (2014): in dialogue speakers often echo parts of the immediately preceding960
utterance, through lexical choice or the grammatical construction. The representation in (38) shows a961
slightly simplified version of the glosses of (37c-37d) as a diagraph, a schema in which the resonant elements962
between the two utterances are aligned (Du Bois, 2014: 362). The underlined pronominal elements in (38)963
are resonant because they occur in mirroring positions of the dialogic structure and have the same grammat-964
ical function, but they display opposing semantic values (second versus first person). The contrast between965
A and B in (38) is further highlighted by the free pronouns on opposite sides of the clause, i.e. the clause966
initial second person pronoun in (37c) and the clause final first person pronoun in (37d).967
(38) A: you -perhaps steal 3nsg- 2sg- AUX -PST -1sg
B: why steal 1sg.IRR- AUX -2sg -SUB me
The primary semiotic function of M is to index the relation between the reported speaker and the968
reported message. In the absence of a dedicated M-clause, properties of a defenestrated clause that are969
therefore particularly well-suited to compensate for the underspecification of the functions of M are indexical970
elements. The pronominal resonance in (37d) has two effects: on the one hand it simply mimics a turn in971
dialogue, which suggest two separate reported speakers, and since these speakers are indexed with local972
pronouns across these two entities are alternately construed as speaker and addressee. But in addition, and973
more significantly, these indexical elements perform a second function: they serve to imply values that in a974
regular frame-in construction would be explicitly indicated in the M-clause.975
The relevance of indexicality is not restricted to pronominal elements, however, and this introduces a976
third strategy common in defenestrated clauses: they disproportionately involve elements that are ‘judge977
dependent’ or invoke ‘protagonist projection’ (see section 4.2.7). Such subjective, evaluative words include978
interjections, modals and predicates of personal taste. Taking a maximally inclusive approach to such979
elements, table 1 lists all item types of judge-dependent words in the narrative text of which (37) form the980
opening lines (see Spronck, 2015b: 271–287).39 The relative frequencies of the judge-dependent elements in981
table 1 are shown in table 2. The table compares non-attributed (i.e. ‘regular’ utterances, which do not982
constitute frame-in or defenestrated clauses), defenestrated clauses and frame-in constructions.983
Although the relative frequencies in 2 are admittedly a crude measure, they demonstrate a fundamental984
property of defenestrated clauses: both frame-in and defenestrated clauses contain a relatively high number985
38Note, however, that the preceding question is subordinated to this imperative clause, and that (37d) therefore forms a
single sentential unit.
39The list also includes negatives, which describe a non-existent entity or event and therefore require some ‘judge’ conceptu-
alising the event or entity (cf. Verhagen, 2005), gradable words and comparatives, which involve a scale, and therefore a norm
that needs to be judged (even if it is by convention or generally recognisable norm, which I’ll assume constitutes a specific
type of ‘judge’ as well), and general evaluative predicates (e.g. jajarrngaliku ‘for fun’, i.e. ‘not seriously’). While it may turn
out that some of these elements are more central to understanding defenestration than others, for our present purposes only
the distribution of these elements between non-attributed, frame-in and defenestrated constructions are taken into account,
and there is no a priori reason to expect the distributions to substantially differ between these construction types using the
inclusive definition of judge-dependent elements.
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items (duplicates within the same construction type removed)
non-attributed yow ‘yeah’, wali ‘wait’, NEG IRR, wadingarri ‘many’, -y2ali indeed, nga ‘yes’,
burray ‘nothing’, -nga ‘only’, ru ‘just’, nimanima, ‘too heavy’, jirrkalwa ‘lie’
defenestrated yow ‘yeah’, -nga ‘only’, ru ‘just’, jajarrngaliku ‘for fun’ (i.e. ‘not seriously’),
jojongarri ‘really many’, =karra ‘maybe’/‘must be’, way ‘none’, -nga ‘only’
frame-in =karra ‘maybe’, IRR negation, maji ‘must’, jadarn ‘properly’, IRR hypothetical,
=karra INDEF, wali ‘wait’, -ah ‘ah’, yow ‘yeah’, IRR negation, ah ‘ah’,
=ka epistemic, yaku ‘try’, IRR epistemic modality, burraynangka ‘nothing’
Table 1: Judge-dependent elements in non-attributed, framed and unframed attributed clauses in the Bowerbird story.
judge-dep. total elements/
elements intonation units
non-attributed 13 13/53 = 0.25
defenestrated 11 11/14 = 0.79
frame-in 22 22/29 = 0.76
Table 2: Distribution of judge-dependent elements
of judge-dependent elements, compared to non-attributed constructions. This finding is replicated for other986
samples of Ungarinyin narratives (cf. Spronck, 2015c: 210). The function of judge-dependent elements in987
defenestrated clauses is similar to that of pronominal elements in that they invoke an indexical meaning988
that signals a reported speaker referent, but across a much wider range of constructions and word classes.989
In frame-in constructions, M-clauses provide a specific referent anchoring such indexical meanings, with990
reported speaker-indexical elements in R maintaining a regular co-indexical relation with the grammatical991
subject of M. In defenestrated clauses, the indexicality of judge-dependent elements is not anchored explicitly,992
but the referential value of the unexpressed M is implied by the judge-dependent values in the defenestrated993
clause. The process was illustrated in the first clause in (30b), which contains two judge-dependent elements:994
the discourse marker aka ‘not so’ and a negated/irrealis verb. The connective aka ‘not so’ has a clear speaker-995
indexical value (a speaker evaluating the event under scope as untrue), which contrasts with the imperative996
event anchored in the subject of the M in (30a). The indexical value of aka ‘not so’ implies a referent for997
the absent M-clause in (30b), and thereby facilitates the interpretation of the defenestrated clause.998
Defenestrated clauses that demonstrate resonant pronominal patterns and judge-dependent indexicality999
form a type of defenestration that relies on elements within the clause itself for signalling its defenestrated1000
status, i.e. they constitute internal defenestration, a class of defenestrated clauses whose interpretation1001
is guided through clause-internal indexical elements. Defenestration is signalled through a diverse set of1002
strategies, and often involves a combination of little-m clauses, illocutionary contrast, pronominal resonance,1003
in addition to extra-linguistic strategies for signalling reported speech status, such (air) quotation marks,1004
voice imitation and other types of mimicry. But despite all these available strategies, internal defenestration1005
often contributes to the interpretation of defenestrated clauses, and represents an area that so far has1006
received relatively little attention.1007
6.2.3. Interpreting defenestration1008
Like insubordination and non-specificity, defenestration is a phenomenon necessarily defined in negative1009
terms: a defenestrated clause expresses the meaning of frame-in, without a syntactic M-element, or with1010
features of M left un(der)specified. This has the important consequence that the class of defenestrated1011
clauses does not form a single, coherent structural construction type, nor do the other elements that can1012
specify aspects of the frame-in relation with defenestrated clauses, such as little-m.1013
Many of the Ungarinyin examples could plausibly be classified as ‘free direct speech’ or ‘free indirect1014
speech’ if we understand them under the common characterisation that ‘[w]hat these two types of reported1015
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speech have in common is that they lack the presence of a reporting clause’ (Keizer, 2009: 848).40 Given the1016
observation that this category is defined by what is not there, it is hardly surprising that ‘the generally used1017
category of Free Indirect Discourse has so far escaped a rigorous definition’ (Verhagen, 2016b: 2). Defining1018
defenestrated clauses/free (in)direct speech (in this sense) as a constructional class is simply the wrong goal.1019
The phenomenon of insubordination (Evans, 2007) provides a helpful parallel here, cf. (39).1020
(39) a. If you could just sit here for a while please (, you would be doing me a favour / I would be happy,1021
etc.) (Evans, 2009)1022
b. (I am surprised / It is an outrage, etc. ) That you would do that!1023
The insubordinate clauses in (39) could be made into regular subordinate clauses with any of the clauses1024
between the round brackets, turning (39a) into a fully standard conditional construction, and (39b) into a1025
complement construction. The constructional status of these insubordinate clauses varies highly within and1026
across languages, with some insubordinate clauses having fully conventionalised, becoming constructions1027
themselves, and some merely remaining non-syntactic discourse patterns (D’Hertefelt and Verstraete, 2014).1028
We could level two irrelevant arguments against labelling the examples in (39) insubordinate clauses: we1029
could say that (39a) nor (39b) could be labelled insubordinate because we cannot reconstruct the precise1030
conditional or main clause that would turn them into subordinate constructions. Second, we could say that1031
(39) does not illustrate a coherent phenomenon, because (39a) represents an insubordinate if-clause and1032
(39b) an insubordinate that-clause. The relevant feature of insubordinate clauses, however, lies not in what1033
is not there (i.e. the form or type of ‘missing’ clause), but in that at least at some level of analysis they are1034
interpreted as an instantiation of the ‘constructional meaning’ (Langacker, 2005) of a more fully developed1035
syntactic structure. Insubordinate clauses may show a degree of constructionalisation themselves as well,1036
but their identity as insubordinate clauses relies on this basic feature.1037
I claim that a similar analysis applies to defenestrated clauses, and the type of signalling found in internal1038
and external defenestration. For defenestration the point is arguably even more straightforward than for1039
insubordination, since subordinate structures are quite diverse, although languages will often include more1040
different types of frame-in constructions than the type illustrated for Ungarinyin here. Having defined1041
the frame-in construction as a dedicated syntactic relation allows us to interpret defenestrated clauses as1042
instances of the frame-in construction in which parts of this relation are signalled through non-syntactic1043
means. But the diversity does not mean that they are random, stylistic, not determined by grammar, or1044
that linguistic convention has become immaterial. What is necessary to classify a defenestrated clause is1045
that we can interpret it as partial expression of a fuller syntactic structure, that it can be interpreted as1046
the ‘linguistic sign’ (in sense of McGregor, 2013: 1152) of a frame-in construction. This can only be done1047
if we have a sufficient semantic description of a full frame-in construction, and this is what the definition1048
of frame-in in section 4 intends to provide. As long as we identify a defenestrated clause as an R without1049
an expressed M, it has to allow us to interpret the variables conventionally determined by the semantics of1050
frame-in.1051
As indicated, a frame-in relation crucially consists of three semantic components: it signals, first, that1052
there should be an R and an M, it signals that M has the semiotic status of an indexical symbol and R that1053
of an iconic symbol, and, third, it projects a double participant structure of evidential and modal values,1054
which in (17) I labelled ‘stance’. Specifically, three variables need to be interpretable in order for a frame-in1055
relation to be understood: these are the identity of the reported speaker pE
ns, the semiotic interpretation1056
of R as an icon, and the identity of the modal narrated speech participant Pn. The interpretation of1057
a defenestrated clause starts with the realisation that the utterance expresses the meaning of a frame-in1058
40I have avoided the terms free (in)direct speech in referring to the Ungarinyin examples here for three reasons. First,
these notions have a long analytic history that is mostly associated with literary analysis that has resulted in often theory-
specific classifications. For example, many of the Ungarinyin defenestrated examples would not be free (in)direct speech in
the sense of Vandelanotte (2009). Second, Ungarinyin does not have a direct-indirect speech opposition, and can thereby not
be characterised as ‘direct speech’, rendering any label including ‘(in)direct speech’ inconsistent. Third, I propose that the
only workable way of interpreting R-clauses without M-clauses is in relation to frame-in, which is not helped by giving them a
common substantive label, rather than to understand them as a result of a process, the process of defenestration.
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How can the reported
speaker (pE
ns) be identified?
By indexation: The
speaker of the reported
message is referentially
specified, through Gesture, e.g.
pointing
Other discourse
referential relations?
‘Little-m’ subjects
By inference: The
speaker of the reported
message cannot be the
current speaker (pE
s),
through
‘Gricean’ convention, e.g.
speakers do not normally
contradict themselves within
a turn or between two
immediately following clauses
Dialogic convention, e.g.
question-answer pairs
(speakers do not normally
act as answerers to their
own questions)
How can the semiotic
status of the narrated
speech event ((p)E
n) as
an icon be interpreted?
By indexation,
based on Punctuation
(in written text)
Gesture, e.g. ‘air
quotation marks’
By inference,
based on
Segmental
exceptionality,
through ...
Mimicry
Voice quality
Boundary
signalling,
through Peripheral elements,
e.g. interjections
Little-m contrasts
Prosody
How can the modal
narrated participant (Pn)
be identified?
By indexation,
through e.g.
adverbs, particles
Not the same as the
subject participant in
the narrated speech
event (pE
ns)
Same as the subject
participant in the
narrated speech event (pE
ns)
By inference Not the same as the
subject participant in
the narrated speech
event (pE
ns), through,
e.g., utterance internal
contradiction
Same as the subject
participant in the narrated
speech event (pE
ns) (default)
Figure 1: Identifying defenestrated elements
29
relation. In a fully expressed frame-in construction, the syntactic structure provides the values for each1059
of these variables,41 for a defenestrated clause the interpretation has to be based on non-syntactic means.1060
External defenestration strategies, such as little-m may help to interpret the semantic structure, as can1061
internal defenestration strategies, such as clustering protagonist projecting indexical constructions. Figure1062
1 sketches a process for the identification of each of the values involved, the reported speaker, the semiotic1063
status of the defenestrated clause and the modal narrated speech participant.421064
The identification of the three elements of the frame-in relation in defenestrated clauses involves two1065
processes, indexation and inference, and two separate classes of signs: grammatical (i.e. conventional1066
construction types expressed through the speech signal) and extra-grammatical ones. The contribution of1067
extra-grammatical types of signalling, such as pointing, voice quality, and quotation marks,43 accounts for1068
the qualification of defenestrated and frame-in constructions as ‘multimodal constructions’ in some of the1069
studies cited above. But from a grammatical perspective, such a characterisation ignores the more important1070
fact that the extra-grammatical signs compensate for identifiable, conventionalised and primarily linguistic1071
aspects of the syntactic frame-in relation. While a speaker may, e.g., point at a discourse participant while1072
uttering a defenestrated clause evoking the interpretation ‘you said this’, this interpretation can only arise1073
if the defenestrated clause is also understood as an iconic utterance that requires a reported speaker and1074
a modal narrated speech participant (i.e. someone who is understood to actually believe the defenestrated1075
clause to be true). In other words, what is distinctive about extra-linguistic signalling in defenestrated1076
utterances is not the presence of the extra-linguistic signals themselves, but the semantic elements these1077
compensate for in the conventionalised meaning structure of the frame-in relation.1078
7. Pragmatics, multimodal meaning and defenestration as a grammatical phenomenon1079
With the account of Ungarinyin frame-in presented in this paper I have hoped to argue for a position1080
in the debate about the division of labour between syntax, semantic and pragmatics in the expression of1081
reported speech that may seem somewhat reactionary in light of much recent literature on multimodality.1082
In this literature, reported speech is frequently described ‘as a complex discourse practice densely packed1083
with verbal and nonverbal resources’ (Hengst et al., 2005), or even as a ‘multimodal construction’:1084
‘Quotation appears to be a multimodal construction. When speakers use direct quotations,1085
they generally produce a high level of demonstration in both the vocal and bodily channels.1086
Moreover, the level of demonstration in each channel is correlated. When speakers use more1087
vocal demonstration, they also use more bodily demonstration [...]’ (Blackwell et al., 2015: 6)1088
I fully agree that examining correlations between multimodal and grammatical expression are long over-1089
due. Studies of multimodality present an important corrective on the singleminded focus on linguistic1090
41The two main missing variables from this set are the indexical status of M, which is constant, and the narrated speech
event En, which should always be provided. As was shown for Ungarinyin above, the interpretation of three variables listed in
figure 1 can indeed receive different semantic values within a frame-in construction.
42The distinction between the (reported) speaker and the modal narrated speech participant is reminiscent of the fundamental
distinction by Goffman (1979) between the speaker (or reported speaker, in this instance) as author (i.e. the entity constructing
an utterance) and the principal (i.e. the entity committing to the truth of the utterance), and the default assumption is that
both roles index the same referent. The present account shares this analysis, but without invoking the notion of speaker roles
(which are inherently problematic in grammatical analysis, see Irvine, 1996): if the contrast between the pEns and the Pn is
not made explicit, they are most likely indexing the same participant. Since defenestrated clauses inherently underspecify the
referent of the pEns, I hypothesise that complex modal meanings, multiple-perspective constructions in which the two entities
as in (14b) are dissociated, are mostly confined to full frame-in constructions, in which the pEns is sufficiently marked. This
expectation is in accordance with, e.g., McGregor’s (1997: 260) observation that M-clauses of thought in Gooniyandi are mostly
used in utterances that contrast two opposing views, although a language that would have a modal marker with a meaning
such as ‘(I believe) contrary to y’s belief’ (cf. Wilkins, 1986; Evans, 2006) could potentially fulfil this requirement in a single
marker.
43For a discussion of the prominence of quotation marks in philosophical approaches to reported speech (quotation), see Saka
(2006).
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convention that has long dominated language studies. Linguistics has shown a notorious neglect of cross-1091
linguistic diversity in usage, meaning and form over the past six decades (Evans and Levinson, 2009), and1092
this neglect certainly includes gesture and other types of multimodality. I believe that it is likely that,1093
especially in the area of what Dor (2015) calls ‘stable experience clusters’, such as kinship or cardinal di-1094
rections (i.e. experiences that have a relatively stable common cultural basis), conventionalised multimodal1095
behaviour may take on a role similar to grammar (cf. Floyd, 2016). Our experience with language and1096
dialogue may even present such an experience cluster: as Pascual (2002; 2014) shows, conversation shapes1097
our lexicon, syntax and conceptualisation in fundamental ways. But, crucially, we can only assess the role1098
of extra-linguistic elements, for our present purposes, in reported speech, if we have a full understanding of1099
what is linguistic and conventional about the phenomenon.1100
Defenestrated clauses rely on intra-clausal and extra-clausal indexical properties for signalling stance1101
meanings, and on the semiotic exceptionality of the iconic defenestrated clause to indicate the reported1102
message meaning. Both indexicality and iconicity (in the semiotic sense) are problematic topics in contem-1103
porary linguistics (cf. Fludernik, 1989), and the contribution of extra-clausal/extra-sentential dependencies1104
does not fit well with a sentence-oriented view of syntax, in which nearly all grammatical functions are de-1105
fined in relation to the verbal predicate. In a strict sense, little-m clauses are not in a syntactic relation with1106
a defenestrated clause under both a predicate-oriented approach and the constructionist account developed1107
here, and the observed diversity of little-m clauses highlights that they are not in a constructional relation1108
with defenestrated clauses. However, little-m clauses derive their interpretation from conventionalised as-1109
pects of the frame-in construction, which is a syntactic judgement. Therefore, if we call phenomena like1110
little-m clauses ‘extra-linguistic’ or ‘stylistic’, this is not a characterisation of the phenomena represented by1111
defenestration, but of what we allow to be part of syntactic theory. Such statements represent an implicit1112
acceptance of the view that clearly conventional meanings such as evidential and modal participants and1113
semiotic status in reported speech are and should not be classified as part of a theory of syntax.1114
If we cannot agree on what aspects of language are conventional and structurally expressed, we cannot1115
make a case about the pragmatics of reported speech. Analyses of the phenomenon in well-described1116
languages, as well as in newly documented languages often find very similar features with respect to the1117
apparent optionality of M-clauses, as in the following statement about Choctaw (Western Muskogean), which1118
mentions aspects that are normally signalled by M:1119
‘Values of the discourse variables ([reported] speaker, self [i.e. current speaker], addressee,1120
place, time) may be shifted whenever the grammatical, stylistic, or discourse context allows1121
them to be identified’ (Broadwell, 1991: 425)1122
This means that in Choctaw, like in Ungarinyin, elements of the semantic structure of frame-in are1123
allowed to remain unexpressed, i.e. to be treated as ‘optional’ under the interpretation in McGregor (2013),1124
if they can be pragmatically recovered. The conclusion cannot be that therefore reported speech is a stylistic,1125
or pragmatic phenomenon. Rather, the reverse is true: the conventional meaning of frame-in is what allows1126
the pragmatic interpretation to take place.1127
While the more fine-grained semantic distinctions of indirect speech and morphological reportativity1128
vary in individual languages, and the opposition between direct and indirect speech form two ends of a1129
continuum/gradient (Evans, 2013), as a construction type I hypothesise that frame-in constructions are1130
semantically regular across languages.44 The reason the properties discussed strike us as odd is because the1131
conventional parts of the frame-in relation are not able to be characterised in common referential-symbolic1132
grammatical terms, but this reflects a limitation of certain approaches to syntax, not a fundamental analysis1133
of reported speech. Reported speech forces us to accept the indexical, iconic, evidential and modal properties1134
laid out in (19) as elements of syntax. With the definition of frame-in, and the approach to defenestration1135
44This article has not attempted to present a typological account, so the validity of the definition of frame-in in section 4
remains to be cross-linguistically established, but the patterns Broadwell (1991) describes closely resemble what I have labelled
here ‘external defenestration’ and phenomena very similar to internal defenestration are described by Haßler (2010) for French,
and by Si and Spronck (2016) in the Dravidian language Solega.
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developed in this paper, I hope to offer an example of how these elements can be reconciled within a syntactic1136
account, and to present a more principled account of the distinction between structural and pragmatic1137
expression in reported speech.1138
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